Corps Squadrons

DuctileHook8257 · 15 September 2014, 11:59 PM

Hi everyone,

While reading up on British aerial activities during the war I've come across the term 'Corps Squadrons' and I'm slightly unsure of it's meaning.

At the moment I'm assuming that it means the squadrons that made up the Royal Flying Corps, however I'm not sure if this is correct. Could someone confirm this or if I am wrong explain what is meant by the term.

Thanks all,
Dan

R Gannon · 16 September 2014, 03:49 PM

Hi Dan

The term derives from the fact that these squadrons worked directly with the army Corps on the ground. An army Corps consisted of between two and four divisions. Their work included photography, artillery observation, contact patrols and a various times even bombing. Oh yes, in late 1918 , they also added aerial resupply of forward troops, to their tasking.

And as there were 18 army Corps serving with the BEF in 1917, there were 18 Corps squadrons; 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 21, 34, 35, 42, 53 & 59 Sqn's. There was no real change to the BEF in 1918 so that number remained constant. Only that in late 1917, 34 & 42 Sqn's had been sent to Italy along with 5 divisions, so as to bolster the flagging Italians after the battle of Caporetto. Their places in the ORBAT of the BEF taken by 69 Sqn / 3AFC & 82 Sqn for 1918.

Whilst the number of fighter, fighter recon and bomber squadrons increased throughout 1918, there was no need to increase the Corps strength, as they were more than sufficient to carry out their tasks. Indeed I have made the point before, that whilst the Corps squadrons suffered at the hands of the Jagdstafflen in the spring of 1917, they were less and less bothered by them as the war continued. And Corps losses to the Jagdstafflen in 1918 were negligible, allowing them to go about their deadly work almost unhindered, except for Flak and ground fire (which accounted for most of their losses).

The Corps squadrons are very much the unsung hero's of the WW1 air war.

The German Fleiger Abteilungen Artillerie (FAA) did much the same work for the Luftstreikrafte, but in my considered opinion, due to the German's susceptibility to bloodiness, they did not prosecute the work with the same vigour or self sacrifice, and as a consequence were less effective.

Cheers Russ

DuctileHook8257 · 17 September 2014, 12:49 AM

Hi Russ,

Thank you for clarifying the term and all of that great extra information.
I have some further questions if anyone can answer them. They are as follows:

I have often wandered how squadrons like these performed artillery observation; specifically how they gathered the information and how they relayed it back to HQ.
What did aerial resupply entail, I'm assuming they drop packages down to the troops below?
Finally, how did the squadrons go about aerial photography, did several aircraft takes photos of a similar area or did they all go off on their own and photo a specific location they were tasked with?

Thanks again,
Dan

MikeMeech · 17 September 2014, 10:28 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by DuctileHook8257

Hi Russ,

Thank you for clarifying the term and all of that great extra information.
I have some further questions if anyone can answer them. They are as follows:

I have often wandered how squadrons like these performed artillery observation; specifically how they gathered the information and how they relayed it back to HQ.
What did aerial resupply entail, I'm assuming they drop packages down to the troops below?
Finally, how did the squadrons go about aerial photography, did several aircraft takes photos of a similar area or did they all go off on their own and photo a specific location they were tasked with?

Thanks again,
Dan

Hi

These are all big questions. I suggest at some stage you download the six Volumes of 'War in the Air' which is available free on the internet, it gives a good overview of the British air operations during WW1.

Artillery Spotting - Experimented with pre-war, tried out using Very Lights and smoke balls for signalling information back to the guns. Wireless was seen as better to use but had to be developed into a 'lighter form' (Sterling Set) although other sets were used initially. Signal Lamps were also used to send back information to the ground in 1914 into 1915. White Strips were used by Artillery units to send messages to Aeroplanes. All details of how to do this was laid down in official pamphlets from December 1914, this became the SS.131 document from December 1916. It became thicker as the war progressed, with the last edition published in 1920. During the battle of Massines in 1917, two way wireless telegraphy was used to communicate wit Heavy artillery to enable the aeroplane to stay over the target area without returning to read the gunner's signals, this trial was successful so it was introduced at the start of 1918. The wireless equipment was put into Bristol Fighters (they could defend themselves better over enemy lines than the Corps Sqns normal RE.8 and FK.8 aeroplanes in use in 1918), these aeroplanes were attached to Corps sqns., latter becoming 'lettered' Flights. The system evolved continuously throughout the war.

The air supply system, I presume you are talking about the 1918 version rather than that used at Kut in 1915. The system used was designed by the Australian Captain L J Wackett of 3 Sqn AFC. Parachutes were made of aeroplane fabric about 14 ft. in diameter with a 1 ft. diameter hole in the centre. It was attached to a small arms ammunition box which was attached to the bomb rack, when released the falling box pulled the parachute out of its tin can container and deployed. Used by 9 Sqn. in July 1918, to supply 4th Australian Division, the lower wingtips were painted black for 3 ft. from the tip to identify them as the supply aeroplanes to the troops.
The Germans appear to have used wicker baskets with parachutes attached to drop supplies.

Photographic Reconnaissance - Again something that was tried out pre war and constantly evolved during the war. Cameras were first attached to the outside of the fuselage (eg. on BE.2 series and other early aeroplanes) then inside on later types. Single glass plate cameras at first, hand reloaded, then semi-automatic plate loading and later 'film' cameras. The Corps aeroplanes engaged in 'close' PR, while Army sqns. were involved in more distant PR, using aeroplanes such as the DH.4. Depending on the period of war and the air situation they could be alone or in a formation to try to fight their way through. This topic is covered in detail in Terrence J Finnegan's 'Shooting the Front', Spellmount, 2011. (Allied only).
The 'Corps' type work is covered fairly well, for all sides' in E R Hooton's, 'War Over the Trenches', Ian Allan, 2010.

I hope that is of use but it is a big topic, you may also find more information on a search of this Forum.

Mike

R Gannon · 17 September 2014, 03:22 PM

Hi Dan

To add onto Mike's informative post, I agree it is a BIG topic, but sadly one that is little understood and appreciated by far too many WW1 air war enthusiasts. And I think it is the importance and volume of the Corps work that under realised. Too many loose themselves in the body count mentality, believing that numbers of machines shot down indictates who was winning in the air. But it is really who provided their ground troops with the most and meaningful support.

In regards photography I like this quote from the lecture notes of AVM AN Wrigley RAAF whom had been a pilot with 3 AFC in 1918:

"Air photography became big a business. In 1918 photographs taken averaged about 1000 per day and the number of prints made about 6000. The record number of photographs taken on one day was just over 4000.

It is unnecessary to emphasise the value of up to date photographs issued to companies and platoons immediately before an attack.

Their use to find the rear lines of defence is also obvious. Daily photographs of railway stations enables an intelligence staff to judge trend of traffic..."

And of course photos, particularly those taken by the Corps squadrons were vital for making trench maps. And these needed constant updating, particularly in 1918, when the front lines became far more fluid, due to the German spring offensives, and the final Allied offensives in the last four months.

More to follow

R Gannon · 17 September 2014, 03:42 PM

Wrigley was attached to the Air Ministry in London in WW2 and had access to the archives, and some useful tables can be found in a useful book called The Decisive Factor, based on his lecture notes. These include photos taken by the RFC on a monthly basis for 1917:
Jan 5352
Feb 5837
Mar 5822
Apr 11,682 (bare in mind this was Bloody April)
May 11,795 (the battle of Arras was still going)
Jun 11,893
Jul 13,165
Aug 11,103 (Third Ypres, but weather bad)
Sep 15,837 (Third Ypres, better weather)
Oct 11,224 (Third Ypres deteriorating weather)
Nov 5,000
Dec 9,993
1917 total of 118,702.

Now I've called on Communiques for 1918
And Feb 18 to EOW a total of 259,311.

These of course include those taken by Fighter Recon and the Bomber squadrons, but none the less a fair indicator of the amount of work being done.

Some more to follow.

R Gannon · 17 September 2014, 04:10 PM

I'd like to underscore some point in regards Corps artillery observation. Their main task was to undertake counter battery missions - this entailed directing the fire of the heavy batteries; the 60 Pounders, 6inch, 8 inch & 9.2 inch howitzers. The directing of the field artillery of the infantry divisions - 18 pounders & 4.5inch howitzers - was left to ground observers, as this was mainly against the first lines of trenches and wire. And as one cannot simply fire off a map (not then, and not in my military time), the engaging of the much deeper sited German batteries, required air observation - Corps aircraft or balloons. Indeed as Trenchard himself noted,"Counter battery work without air observation is in most cases of very little value."

Now Wrigley also supplies figure for the number of German batteries engaged for destruction by British heavy artillery by means of Corps observation in 1917
Jul 1,940
Aug 1,860
Sep 1,372
Oct 1,189
Nov 291
Dec 360.

Now this did not let up in 1918. I might just cite RAF Communique 7 for period 13 May - 19 May which saw 590 German batteries engaged for destruction and another 105 for neutralisation and a further 518 zone calls. (not to mention 13,964 photos taken and 195.25 tons of bombs dropped).

And herein lies another inconvenient truth for some, not one Corps plane was shot down by the Jagdstafflen in this period. Whilst even with the incomplete German casualty record, the RAF fighter pilots accounted for 5 hard kills against their opposite number the FAA's.

To me this volume of work, both photos and counter battery fire, when weighed off against the increasing inability of the Jagdstafflen to interfere, demonstrates who really were dominating the skies on the BEF sector.

Cheers Russ

DuctileHook8257 · 18 September 2014, 12:47 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by MikeMeech

Hi

These are all big questions. I suggest at some stage you download the six Volumes of 'War in the Air' which is available free on the internet, it gives a good overview of the British air operations during WW1.

Artillery Spotting - Experimented with pre-war, tried out using Very Lights and smoke balls for signalling information back to the guns. Wireless was seen as better to use but had to be developed into a 'lighter form' (Sterling Set) although other sets were used initially. Signal Lamps were also used to send back information to the ground in 1914 into 1915. White Strips were used by Artillery units to send messages to Aeroplanes. All details of how to do this was laid down in official pamphlets from December 1914, this became the SS.131 document from December 1916. It became thicker as the war progressed, with the last edition published in 1920. During the battle of Massines in 1917, two way wireless telegraphy was used to communicate wit Heavy artillery to enable the aeroplane to stay over the target area without returning to read the gunner's signals, this trial was successful so it was introduced at the start of 1918. The wireless equipment was put into Bristol Fighters (they could defend themselves better over enemy lines than the Corps Sqns normal RE.8 and FK.8 aeroplanes in use in 1918), these aeroplanes were attached to Corps sqns., latter becoming 'lettered' Flights. The system evolved continuously throughout the war.

The air supply system, I presume you are talking about the 1918 version rather than that used at Kut in 1915. The system used was designed by the Australian Captain L J Wackett of 3 Sqn AFC. Parachutes were made of aeroplane fabric about 14 ft. in diameter with a 1 ft. diameter hole in the centre. It was attached to a small arms ammunition box which was attached to the bomb rack, when released the falling box pulled the parachute out of its tin can container and deployed. Used by 9 Sqn. in July 1918, to supply 4th Australian Division, the lower wingtips were painted black for 3 ft. from the tip to identify them as the supply aeroplanes to the troops.
The Germans appear to have used wicker baskets with parachutes attached to drop supplies.

Photographic Reconnaissance - Again something that was tried out pre war and constantly evolved during the war. Cameras were first attached to the outside of the fuselage (eg. on BE.2 series and other early aeroplanes) then inside on later types. Single glass plate cameras at first, hand reloaded, then semi-automatic plate loading and later 'film' cameras. The Corps aeroplanes engaged in 'close' PR, while Army sqns. were involved in more distant PR, using aeroplanes such as the DH.4. Depending on the period of war and the air situation they could be alone or in a formation to try to fight their way through. This topic is covered in detail in Terrence J Finnegan's 'Shooting the Front', Spellmount, 2011. (Allied only).
The 'Corps' type work is covered fairly well, for all sides' in E R Hooton's, 'War Over the Trenches', Ian Allan, 2010.

I hope that is of use but it is a big topic, you may also find more information on a search of this Forum.

Mike

Hi Mike,

Thank you for that fantastic information, it is indeed of use to me. Thank you also for the book recommendations. I shall search the Internet for 'War in the Air' and download the volumes immediately.

Dan

DuctileHook8257 · 18 September 2014, 01:10 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by R Gannon

I'd like to underscore some point in regards Corps artillery observation. Their main task was to undertake counter battery missions - this entailed directing the fire of the heavy batteries; the 60 Pounders, 6inch, 8 inch & 9.2 inch howitzers. The directing of the field artillery of the infantry divisions - 18 pounders & 4.5inch howitzers - was left to ground observers, as this was mainly against the first lines of trenches and wire. And as one cannot simply fire off a map (not then, and not in my military time), the engaging of the much deeper sited German batteries, required air observation - Corps aircraft or balloons. Indeed as Trenchard himself noted,"Counter battery work without air observation is in most cases of very little value."

Now Wrigley also supplies figure for the number of German batteries engaged for destruction by British heavy artillery by means of Corps observation in 1917
Jul 1,940
Aug 1,860
Sep 1,372
Oct 1,189
Nov 291
Dec 360.

Now this did not let up in 1918. I might just cite RAF Communique 7 for period 13 May - 19 May which saw 590 German batteries engaged for destruction and another 105 for neutralisation and a further 518 zone calls. (not to mention 13,964 photos taken and 195.25 tons of bombs dropped).

And herein lies another inconvenient truth for some, not one Corps plane was shot down by the Jagdstafflen in this period. Whilst even with the incomplete German casualty record, the RAF fighter pilots accounted for 5 hard kills against their opposite number the FAA's.

To me this volume of work, both photos and counter battery fire, when weighed off against the increasing inability of the Jagdstafflen to interfere, demonstrates who really were dominating the skies on the BEF sector.

Cheers Russ

Russ,

Thank you for that added information. The figures for aerial photos amaze me, that is a massive amount to be taking each month.

In regards to the artillery side of things, could you clarify the terms 'neutralisation' and 'zone call', as I know relatively nothing about Artillery Observation so don't know what these entail.

Thanks again,
Dan

R Gannon · 18 September 2014, 09:51 PM

Hi Dan

Essentially when an enemy (German) battery was located on a Corps front, an aircraft from the embedded Corps squadron would be detailed to conduct a shoot for a battery of heavy guns upon that battery. The said machine would take off and fly over the radio station for the allotted battery and send a simple code letter in Morse, whereupon the radio operators would lay out a panel to signify they were receiving the aircrafts radio call. The machine would then cross the lines and commence to fly a figure eight pattern at around 6,000ft above the targeted battery position, and at the same time send another transmission code letter saying they were ready. The ranging gun of the battery would fire the first ranging shot 'off the map' so to speak. The observer would then plot the impact on a map layover, and relay the information, thus beginning the correction of fire. When on target, the final lays of the ranging gun would be relayed to the other guns, and the battery would proceed to fire for effect.

Now if enemy Flak made it impossible to stay on station, or indeed another battery was spotted firing, then a neutralising mission was fired. This was off the map shooting, without correction, based on a map reference sent by the spotting aircraft. And as such highly unlikely to hit the battery. But none the less, it would likely cause the gunners to take refuge in their dugouts, thus neutralising their fire. And this in itself was enough, particularly if an attack was going in.

Zone fire, basically, entailed the trench map being overlaid with zones - grid squares 1,000 x 1,000 yards - and if Corps crews observed targets of opportunity - troops massing for counter attacks, transport, or batteries on the move - then a zone fire was called, and every available battery which could hit the reported zone would fire on it.

Balloons also did the same. The advantage of the Corps machine was that flying above the target allowed for more accurate corrections. Balloon observers when ranging, had deal with the foreshortening of ground effect.

Hope that make sense.

And just to go back to the bigger picture; as said, the divisional field artillery, without air observation, were responsible for the first defence line - their trenches and wire. The heavy artillery engaged the deeper targets - in particular enemy batteries. Whilst day bombers went after value targets beyond the range of the guns - communication hubs, railway sidings, ammo dumps, billets, bridges and aerodromes.

Cheers Russ