Richthofen's death,a form of suicide?

[Eric Husher]

Originally Posted by Roadhog

Allow me to introduce my self, I am Roadhog, the site anarchist. My job is to stir up the pot and rebut idiotic responses. My facts all come from Enemy Ace comic books and Cat Fancy Magazine.

BTW, Lenny Bruce always said if you have to explain the jokes, you are too hip for the room. Your pal, Scott Price

BTW, and often indicate that feeble attempts at humor are in use.

... Does this mean 'Cat Fancy' reported the Baron snivelling into his cornflakes every morning before he took off? Musta missed that issue!

[bristol scout]

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

This initial CL incident is remarked upon in a wide number of references, including Munson, but you can also see it in a variety of places online, including here:

Polish Aviation Museum Cracow

Here is another good quote about ground attack generally by the Germans:
"Trampled underfoot: The story of attack aviation in the German spring offensives of 1918," Chad G Clark, Air Power History,Summer 199, Volume 45, Issue 2, pp.16-25 (ISSN: 1044016X), also at http://www.ku.edu/carrie/archives/ww.../msg00245.html

Clark wrote:
"According to Ernest von Hoeppner, general of the Luftstreitkrafte, "The battle in Flanders had increased the possibilities for the use of aviation in a direction that was fully of significance for the further development of the arm."19 Noting the "great moral effect" of strafing attacks by low-flying aircraft, Hoeppner relates that on July 10, 1917, attack sorties were first arranged to systematically accompany advancing infantry, which advanced in coordination with a successful counterattack along the coast at Lombartzyde.20 Capt. Helmut Wilberg provided the intellectual foundation for German attack aviation. As Air Commander for the Fourth Army, Wilberg was the first to organize attack aircraft into formations, greatly enhancing the effectiveness of the mission.21 From these efforts, the Luftstreitkrafte found that aircraft used in units formed specifically for ground attack and "working in closest cooperation with their comrades on the ground," against enemy troops massing behind the lines prior to an offensive represented the best use of attack aviation. After Flanders, attack aviation represented an "opportunity that was not neglected."

As for Sturmtruppen tactics being used by the French, or anyone else prior to the Germans, it is important to remember and understand what made the Sturmtruppen different from the various Allied efforts prior. The Sturmtruppen worked WITH aircraft, and their attacks were COORDINATED with specialized ground attack aircraft, and this was never done by the Allied infiltrators. As such, the German effort was the first proper use of 'combined arms' that included aircraft, and certainly in its intial efforts was quite successful! The fact that the great German offensive eventually ground to a halt and then was pushed back had more to do with large numbers of fresh American troops pouring in alongside the already battle-hardened british and French than any failure in German tactics. They simply had waited too long to put the offensive in motion, or rather, were unable to get the offensive started quickly enough, and 'ran out of steam.'

Ah! the Americans were the reason the great offensives 'ground to a halt'---now I see

Sorry---but no, they were not.

The 'Kaiserschlacht' WAS a race against time-the last throw enabled by the defeat of a once powerful enemy against the only enemy still never to have been broken (or come perilously close). If that enemy (Britain and Dominion) did not oblige and crumple quickly, then perhaps more than one 'last throw' would be needed---but if the first (and most massive) had failed, what real hope for subsequent 'blows'?

It would simply become another phase in the wearing down process the pounding (as Wellington would have said) or the even more self explanatory "who hold's out the longest" as Haig said.---In one respect, the POTENTIAL of the American involvment was central to German planning of course. But the main weight of the attack fell on the British.

Indeed the front crumbled--on 21st. March the Germans had reached the British Gun line!! But now a cardinal weakness--

"The roads were fairly full, and this time while it would be wrong to say there was panic the retreat resembled more of a rout than had previously been the case, Everyone seemed anxious to get away as quickly as possible and regardless of anyone else...A few military policemen on horses tried to enforce some kind of order, but no one took much notice. HAD THE GERMANS BEEN ABLE TO BREAK THROUGH WITH CAVALRY OR ARMOURED CARS the war would have ended then"
Arthur Behrend--- 'As From Kemmel Hill'

Or--

"It was a crowning mercy that they had no cavalry. How many times during the retreat did we thank heaven for this! The sight of a few mounted men in the distance would at once send a ripple of anxiety and the word CAVALRY being whispered and passed down the line. Men looked apprehensively over their shoulders, fearful lest horsemen might be already behind them. Cavalry was the one factor which would have smashed morale in an twinkling"

Sydney Rogerson --'The Last Of The Ebb'

Cavalry---armoured car's----arms of exploitation---the historical role of cavalry was to run down broken troops---But all of Germany's Cavalry were in the East---ministering to Ludendorffs grandiose plans--What weapon of exploitation did the Germans have-----Attack aeroplanes!----Why are they

a) not mentioned.

b) not able to turn retreat into rout.

Because they were'nt doing much----note I don't say were'nt doing ANYTHING---but they made no impact--that's the point. and at that moment of supreme chance for Germany---why were not ordinary scouts strafing British columns constantly---all day?

No The Americans did'nt smash the great German offensives, though they helped.

Look no further than the Indomitable Canadians, the redoubtable Australians--but never forget the simple but hardened battle practitioners of the British regiments---nor the French of course, recovered from the mutinous moments and regaining there poise....

Dave.

[bristol scout]

Let me repeat Eric---I never say the German ground attack aeroplanes did nothing----that would be both silly and ignorant of history and I am niether.

What I do say is simple----No British histories, no regimental histories make VERY MUCH of German ground attack---and "havoc" ----never on the British front!!

In that supreme moment of near victory for Germany WHY was'nt just about everything airworthy thrown, with machineguns and bombs, against the retreating British---close, very close to routed British (but not close enough)?

It was in fact the R.A.F that did that, exactly that, to the Germans!
'All arms attacks were the forte of the allies, NOT the Germans.
To enunciate the tactics to be used is one thing---but to PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE---well, that is something else entirely I think.

Please do not assume my capitals mean I am shouting Eric

Dave.

[Eric Husher]

I think you might want to look at your own quotes again.... "Indeed the front crumbled--on 21st. March the Germans had reached the British Gun line!! But now a cardinal weakness--

"The roads were fairly full, and this time while it would be wrong to say there was panic the retreat resembled more of a rout than had previously been the case, Everyone seemed anxious to get away as quickly as possible and regardless of anyone else...A few military policemen on horses tried to enforce some kind of order, but no one took much notice. HAD THE GERMANS BEEN ABLE TO BREAK THROUGH WITH CAVALRY OR ARMOURED CARS the war would have ended then"
Arthur Behrend--- 'As From Kemmel Hill'

One of the main reasons the Brits were in this condition was largely due to the CL's and the Sturmtruppen. German aircraft WERE all over the place (the Baron being one of them, machine-gunning columns of Allied troops just days before his own demise), and they DID cause a LOT of problems for the Allies. You might want to have a look at some of the German references as well as the British on this topic, as it is well-known that nobody likes to report about problems encountered. As well, to equate aircraft with either cavalry or mechanized forces is now, and always has been a fallacy.

Here is an excellent source from the German side, written shortly after the war was over: The German Air Force In The Great War by Georg Paul Neumann

It makes for some interesting reading! Here's one good one in reference to the 'shootup' on the Somme:

ATTACKING THE SOMME BRIDGES AT BRAY AND ST. CHRIST
On the 6th of September 1917 we were compelled, to evacuate Peronne owing to the vigorous English attacks which were hurled against our lines, supported by a large number of tanks and heavy artillery fire. From the grey light of dawn until late in the evening our trench-strafing machines were in the air striving to relieve our hard-pressed infantry, and they wore on the ground barely long enough for the machines to be prepared for the next flight. Then one morning a pilot from an infantry contact patrol arrived with startling news of a hostile force composed of every branch of the service which was approaching Peronne from the south in a long column along the west bank of the Somme, at the point where the bridges at Bray and St. Christ crossed the river.
It seems a heaven-sent opportunity to the trench-strafing pilots, and a few minutes later twenty-four machines from our squadron start off on that fine September day. The prearranged height for assembly is soon reached: then the Halberstadts make straight for the lines, and soon Cambrai is beneath us. We have no difficulty in recognising the front lines, which are enveloped in a pall of smoke and dust. Without hesitation every machine plunges into that inferno, and it seems as though these gigantic birds rival each other in daring. The explosions of shell and. shrapnel are clearly visible against their dull background; thick black clouds of smoke roll across the earth. The iron song of the engine drowns all anxiety and soothes the nerves.
Only 1200 feet up; a rocket is fired as a signal, and the squadron splits into two lines, one behind the other. Two or three minutes later we are above the enemy. Nerves are strained to the uttermost, and with eager eyes we seek to pierce the thick clouds of smoke. We cast glances at the sky above, where great clouds, which seem to indicate the advent of bad weather, are appearing. Peronne, that devastated village, is blazing away on our left front; soon the shimmering ribbon of the Somme emerges through the haze, and a few seconds later we are over the objective. A quick glance at the map tells us that we have hit the right spot; there on the right lies Bray, and on the left is St. Christ. We see objects like thin cords stretched across the bridges. Not far ahead there appears a white puff of smoke, the first shrapnel shell welcoming our arrival; no damage is done. At a signal from the leader's machine we all descend in a steep glide upon the bridges!
One thousand feet, 800 feet, 500 feet—then—the heart beats until it seems that it must burst and every pulse in the body throbs. Down below on the bridge itself and the shore on either side are thick columns of men, horses, and wagons. A storm of machine bullets pours down upon them- At first no result is perceptible; it is almost as though we were shooting on some inanimate target; and then— men, horses, and lorries scatter pell-mell. Their only thought now is to save themselves by getting off the road, and we see them fleeing wildly in every direction. It is on the bridges themselves, however, that the confusion is at its worst. Teams break loose and jump into the river, men, beasts, and all; it seems as if the multitude were possessed by evil genii.
Our bombs and hand grenades whistle pitilessly down into the chaos, and I see more than one strike the very middle of the bridge. We are hardly 200 feet up, and it is possible to see every detail Again we return to the attack, and involuntarily one casts a glance at the villages on the east bank of the river, where, standing huddled up against a garden wall, arc between twenty and thirty horsemen. That in all probability will be the General Staff. Already the machine guns are chattering; the result is wild confusion, collisions, and a complete rout.
Suddenly two Sopwith scouts attack our machines from the left flank; after a short conflict I see one of them plunge down to destruction and the other hastily makes off. Twice again the machine guns rake the columns below, until almost every cartridge has been expended. After returning to our aerodrome to replenish our ammunition, we set off to the attack once more; again we met with the same success.
We had paralysed an entire English division ; our infantry gained time to consolidate their new positions in peace. Our achievement was commended by an Army communique in words that will never be forgotten, (Hermann.)

During the 1918 Offensive

We have already discussed the work of the reconnaissance machines. When the advance came to a standstill they were again required to take over the work usually associated with trench warfare. The trench-strafing machines worked indefatigably from all heights, and on every section of the battle front, directing most of their attention against the enemy's reinforcements. They specialised in attacking the narrow roads and bridges of the Somme, and the results of their work were seen in the evacuated region after the enemy had retreated. In co-operation with the artillery they frequently caused great confusion at such points. Throughout the whole of the offensive the infantry contact machines were working incessantly over the lines.

[bristol scout]

Why would I "want to look at my own quotes again"...?

[Eric Husher]

You want to look at them again, because they don't support the cause you are espousing, and thus you might wish to retract them....

[bristol scout]

Retract them! You are amusing if nothing else..

I will try one more time-

"...we found the country roads much blocked with troops and transport of all kinds. The staff work has failed here, and for miles transport congested all the approaches. ONE ENTERPRISING BOCHE AIR SQUADRON, flying low, could have played the duece here on these roads, but NOT ONE CAME"

Colonel Repington at St. Mihiel noting American failures in staff work.

Repington--'The First World War'

You seem unable to grasp that IF the idea of the big German offensives of 1918 was to win the war----to drive a wedge between French and British and, (defeating the British meant the end for France also), thus accomplish something that no other offensives on the Western front had managed then the absolute need for SOME arm of exploitation ---ANY arm that could harrass the retreating troops into full rout was ESSENTIAL.

In those day's---sorry if you struggle with this--that arm was cavalry---but the Germans had left ALL of that in the East....in the Baltic and Ukraine.
They had no armoured cars and (unlike the British) not even motorcycle mounted (sidecar) machine guns!

They had no interest in (not wholly misplaced) Tanks (not ever in that war anything remotely like a war winning weapon) and therfore--and this is my point the pursuit of the retreating British could be accomplished only as quickly as the Germans could walk!!---And that is the same speed that the British could walk also, therefore NO exploitation of a crushed and temporarily retreating enemy could be possible.

That scenario equates to failure for Germany---and that on the last throw of the dice. Not ideal I am tempted to say.

Now what other ARM OF EXPLOITATION did they have? Well, Aeroplanes.

Did THEY turn retreat into rout? Well, patently not.

Are you sure the cause for the British retreat was "CL and Sturmtruppen"

I posit an alternative reason-

The attack on 21st. March fell on the British 5th. army ELEVEN DIVISIONS STRONG (with two Cavalry Divisions--but in action a cavalry division dismounted is only the equivalent of an infantry brigade) 3rd. Army further north had 10 divisions (with four in reserve). 25 Divisions.

50 ---that is FIFTY German divisions were in action that day---look no further for a severe defeat. look no further at 'stormtroopers'---dismiss "CL" types as of no import---in the final analysis!--FIFTY divisions of farm labourers could have accomplished nearly as much...

Was the "Baron machine-gunning columns of allied troops just day's before his own demise"?


Did'nt cause a rout anywhere!

But I tire of attempting to do the impossible, and your high handed tone has limited my urge to enlighten you further.."I might want to retract" is rich coming from someone who needed to be told MvR was NOT shot in the head.....

[bristol scout]

After checking further I see that of those FIFTY German Divisions---no fewer than FORTY THREE of them were in action against Fifth Armies 11 or max. 12.---and aided of course by fog.

'The Evolution Of Victory'--- Andy Simpson

[Felix C]

I guess I should ask what is currently the best book to have regarding MvR?

Not only the last flight, but his development as a pursuit pilot?

Is his auto-bio. accurate or a propaganda piece or heavily censored or both?

Floyd Gibbons book still relevant?

[Eric Husher]

Originally Posted by Felix C

I guess I should ask what is currently the best book to have regarding MvR?

Not only the last flight, but his development as a pursuit pilot?

Is his auto-bio. accurate or a propaganda piece or heavily censored or both?

Floyd Gibbons book still relevant?

I think it all depends on who you read, and when it was written. Mine comes from a compilation of a wide variety of sources... The Osprey 'Albatros Aces of WW1, vol 1 & 2, is good as far as it goes, and then follow up with 'Fokker DR1 Aces of WW1,' and then throw in a good history of Jasta 'Boelke,' and another about Jasta 11, plus the Richtofen Geschwaders and you will get a pretty good and balanced roundup of the Baron's career...