Untangling an 11 Sqn Engagement, 29 Sep 1918

Buffnut453 · 17 May 2022, 06:27 PM

Hi Folks,

I’m trying to interpret and integrate a number of different sources to work out a relative’s role in the air fighting in Sept-Nov 1918 and I’d appreciate some help grading my homework…and perhaps enhance it with additional insights from those more expert than I in Great War aerial combat.

A relative of mine, Jim Gamble, served as a Sergeant Pilot on 11 Sqn and, for now, I’m focusing on a bomber escort sortie he flew on 29 Sep 1918. His logbook entry for that date says that he took off at 0715 with a task to “Escort DH4s to Cambrai, Bohain, Le Cateau.” Sortie duration was 2hrs 20mins at an altitude of 17,000ft.

The 13th Wing task Operation Order 421 (Source: UKNA AIR 1/1809/204/161/5) provides additional details below:.

“No.11 Squadron to carry out offensive patrols in conjunction with No.57 Squadron’s bomb raids and reconnaissances. All patrols to be as strong as possible. Arrangements will be made direct between Squadron Commanders.”

“No.57 Squadron: First raid objective – Esnes and Wallincourt. Second raid objective – Carnieres and Beauvois. The first raid will leave the ground as early as possible, and the second raid as late as possible.”

There is a surviving combat report from 29 Sep 1918 submitted by 2Lt’s Peacock and Kelty of 11 Sqn (Source: UKNA AIR 1/219/204/5/2634). Their report contains the following details:

- Patrol Strength: 12
- Locality: S.E. Cambrai
- Time: 8.45 a.m.
- Duty: Escort to Bomb Raid
- Height: 9,000ft

Whilst on escort to bomb raid, I observed 6 Fokker biplanes flying about 200 yards behind and above me. I dived on one E.A. below this formation and fired a burst of 30 rounds. This E.A. seemed to be quite out of control, diving and spinning.

I then did a climbing turn and my observer opened fire on an E.A. which was following me down. He fired a burst of 20 rounds at close range; E.A. then burst into flames, which was seen by other Bristols in the formation.

There are some differences in location and altitude but I think, in general, Jim’s logbook entry tallies pretty well in terms of task, time and location, with the 13th Wing Order and the combat report, which suggests he was part of the 11 Sqn 12-aircraft formation.

The fighting wasn’t all one-sided. One of 11 Squadron’s machines, F5814, was shot down in flames at 0850 with 2Lt Smith and Lt Bromley killed in action. The victor was a Fokker D.VII piloted by Josef Mai of Jasta 5; it was his 30th kill ((Source: Franks, Norman, Guest, Russell, and Bailey, Frank Black September 1918 (Grub Street, 2018), pp.182, 187).

Looking at the German side, Josef Mai claimed a Bristol F2b east of Caudry at 0850 (Source: "The Jasta War Chronology" Norman Franks et al). That appears to tally with the loss of Smith and Bromley by 11 Sqn. However, other German records don't align well.

For example, the only Fokker D.VII loss in the area was Lt Fritz Hoffman of Jasta B who was shot down west of Cambrai by 64 Sqn (Source: "The Jasta War Chronology" Norman Franks et al...although "Casualties of the German Army Air Service", Norman Franks et al, says Hoffman belonged to Jasta 2). Thus the claims of Peacock and Kelty seem to be spurious.

There was also a claim for a DH9 by Uffz Treiber of Jasta 5 at 0845 northeast of Caudry, the victim being attributed to D3172 of 27 Sqn, with 2Lts Thomas and Brown killed in action (Source: "The Jasta War Chronology" Norman Franks et al). The timing and location of this claim put it very close indeed to the action involving the 11 Sqn Bristols and I'm wondering if the DH9 identification is incorrect, and Treiber simply claimed an 11 Sqn machine that wasn't, in fact, shot down? It seems odd to me that the Jasta 5 formation would engage two separate RAF formations at the same time, and I struggle to believe that Jasta 5 could put up two formations simultaneously, not if one of them comprised 6 airframes.

Based on all this conflicting information, the best assessment I can come up with is that Peacock and Kelty attacked Lt Hoffman of Jasta 2 who, by happenstance, was flying below a formation of 6 Fokker D.VIIs of Jasta 5. At least one Fokker of Jasta 5 then dived to attack Peacock and Kelty but drove him off without shooting him down. The engagement then evolved into a running scrap for at least 5 minutes during which time Mai shot down Bromley and Smith. This scenario suggests that the victor over the 27 Sqn DH9 of Thomas and Brown is unidentified, indeed they may have been brought down by AAA.

I realize I'm gusting close to madness in trying to make sense of such fragmentary records but does this scenario make sense? Are there other interpretations that are more feasible? Any thoughts/ideas would be very welcome!

Gregvan · 19 May 2022, 01:52 PM

I cannot comment on your questions, but I would just point out that the "Jasta B/Jasta 2" confusion for Ltn. Fritz Hoffmann is not really a discrepancy. Jasta 2 was originally commanded by the famous Oswald Boelcke. After his death, it was re-named "Jagdstaffel Boelcke" in his honor, which is variously rendered as Jasta Boelcke, Jasta 2 "Boelcke", of simply Jasta B. In " Casualties of the German Air Service," they used the original "Jasta 2" for some reason. But they were the same unit.

Ltn. Fritz Hoffmann was not an especially experienced or successful member of Jasta Boelcke. He had only been posted to the unit on 25 August 1918. What was more unique about him was that he was unusually short, even for his time. He was described as "hardly 150 cm tall," (and a photo bears this out), and special additions had to be made to the controls of his Fokker D.VII so he could use them.

Buffnut453 · 19 May 2022, 02:51 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Gregvan

I cannot comment on your questions, but I would just point out that the "Jasta B/Jasta 2" confusion for Ltn. Fritz Hoffmann is not really a discrepancy. Jasta 2 was originally commanded by the famous Oswald Boelcke. After his death, it was re-named "Jagdstaffel Boelcke" in his honor, which is variously rendered as Jasta Boelcke, Jasta 2 "Boelcke", of simply Jasta B. In " Casualties of the German Air Service," they used the original "Jasta 2" for some reason. But they were the same unit.

Ltn. Fritz Hoffmann was not an especially experienced or successful member of Jasta Boelcke. He had only been posted to the unit on 25 August 1918. What was more unique about him was that he was unusually short, even for his time. He was described as "hardly 150 cm tall," (and a photo bears this out), and special additions had to be made to the controls of his Fokker D.VII so he could use them.

Hi Greg,

Many thanks for the contribution. I eventually figured out that Jasta B was shorthand for Jasta Boelcke but I appreciate your confirmation of that detail.

As you can probably tell, my knowledge of the German Army Air Service is virtually non-existent. Perhaps you can answer another Jasta-related question? "The Jasta War Chronology" (Franks et al) lists a number of units with a "b" after the number (e.g. Jasta 16b, 34b, 35b etc). Can you enlighten me as to what the "b" signifies (if anything)?

Finally, many thanks for the details about Fritz Hoffman. His diminutive stature undoubtedly caused him some issues. Can you please point me to the photo of him? I presume it was published somewhere?

I am intrigued by the idea that he might have become caught up in the scrap between Jasta 5 and 11 Sqn. Given that Cambrai marked the divide between the German 2nd and 17th Armies, with Jasta 2 (Boelcke) assigned to the former and Jasta 5 to the latter, it is conceivable that the two Jastas might end up in the same patch of sky. However, that's nothing more than a theory on my part.

Kind regards,
Mark

jsontag · 19 May 2022, 04:38 PM

The b after Jasta 34b for example, means it was a Bavarian Jagdstaffel, in a nutshell.

Buffnut453 · 19 May 2022, 05:05 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by jsontag

The b after Jasta 34b for example, means it was a Bavarian Jagdstaffel, in a nutshell.

Ahhh....I see. Thanks for the explanation, which gives me another little nugget of knowledge.

The Deutsche Luftstreitkräfte is clearly a foreign language to me!

R Gannon · 19 May 2022, 07:03 PM

Hi Mark

Niceties concerning the Luftstreikrafte aside; I’ve spent some 42 years trying to untangle the tangled web that is the WW1 air-war by pro-actively logging aerial combat data into my logs and it is my experience few if any combats are anything but tangled affairs and never as clear cut as the image we see in glossy books. It is always important to put aerial combats into perspective and take into consideration that a major assault by British Fourth Army on the Hindenburg Line was going in on the ground and much of the RAF’s aerial activity was in support; which included the bombing of important targets in the German rear areas between Cambrai & St Quentin. Whilst the twelve 11 Sqn Bristols provided a top cover escort for the DH4s from 57 Sqn it is evident that DH9s from 27 Sqn (9 Bde RAF)were in the same airspace at the same time targeting Busigny, whilst it would appear that the 6 Fokkers encountered by the 11 Sqn crew of Peacock & Kelty were from Jasta 5. Ltn Mai certainly laid claim to the wreck of a ‘BF’ which evidently came down east of Caudry timed 08.50 and given as burned, whilst Uffz Treiber from Jasta 5 actually laid claim to the wreck of a ‘DH4’ (the Grub St corpus routinely takes ‘matching’ liberties with the types claimed) which came down north-east of Caudry at the rather precise time of 08.43 – also given as burned. What the Grub St corpus fails to tell the reader is that FlakBttr 206 & FlakBttr 557 also claimed an unspecified enemy machine which came down and burned at Troisvillers timed 08.45 – this is just 2km east of Caudry, which was south-east of Cambrai and about 8km north of Busigny. This can only reflect either the 11 Sqn Bristol or the 27 Sqn DH9 and effectively means we have three claims and credits for two losses. There are also claims by crews from 27 Sqn & 57 Sqn for two more Fokkers circa 08.45.

Quite frankly I would not put too much weight on the two claims by the 11 Sqn crew as being decisive, let alone reflecting the Jasta Boelcke loss (Ltn Hoffmann was lost WEST of Cambrai but annoyingly without a time making it near impossible to deduce who shot him down). I think it would be fair to say that inexperienced but eager aircrew always wanted to believe that machines they fired upon were shot down. Hindsight would suggest the first lone Fokker simply dived away once attacked from the rear, whilst the notion that 20 rounds could have set the second Fokker on fire is a little optimistic (MvR used to fire 10 and 20 times that many rounds in order to gain a genuine victory). What Kelty and the other Bristol crews undoubtedly saw falling in flames was one of the two missing RAF machines – this was a common misappraisal during the blur of combats; that crews on other machines wanted to believe that machines seen falling in flames were those of the enemy. But by the same token I would not blindly jump to accept the two Jasta 5 credits: as my 42 years of toil tell me that there was not a little taking credits for wrecks within the German claiming system, which not always came down as the result of enemy aerial action: but were lost over the German side due the misfortune of unseen collisions and wing failures, whilst Flak units invariably lost out to the pilots of the Jagdstaffeln in cases of disputed claims. In truth we have precious little worthwhile visibility in regards the vast majority of German aerial victories beyond the game-book listings, and which in my considered opinion have been far too readily accepted by modern authors as reflecting genuinely won aerial victories. Pointedly no one on the British side actually saw either of the two missing machines shot down by any Fokker. Josef Mai’s Flight Log survives but his entries are for the most part ambiguous – in regards his #30 all he provides is ‘ In the morning I downed a BF’ - not much to go on. Other than that all we know is that Mai was flying Fok DVII 898/18. .

I hope that that untangles the engagement a little bit.

Cheers & welcome

Russ

Buffnut453 · 25 May 2022, 06:04 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by R Gannon

Hi Mark

Niceties concerning the Luftstreikrafte aside; I’ve spent some 42 years trying to untangle the tangled web that is the WW1 air-war by pro-actively logging aerial combat data into my logs and it is my experience few if any combats are anything but tangled affairs and never as clear cut as the image we see in glossy books. It is always important to put aerial combats into perspective and take into consideration that a major assault by British Fourth Army on the Hindenburg Line was going in on the ground and much of the RAF’s aerial activity was in support; which included the bombing of important targets in the German rear areas between Cambrai & St Quentin. Whilst the twelve 11 Sqn Bristols provided a top cover escort for the DH4s from 57 Sqn it is evident that DH9s from 27 Sqn (9 Bde RAF)were in the same airspace at the same time targeting Busigny, whilst it would appear that the 6 Fokkers encountered by the 11 Sqn crew of Peacock & Kelty were from Jasta 5. Ltn Mai certainly laid claim to the wreck of a ‘BF’ which evidently came down east of Caudry timed 08.50 and given as burned, whilst Uffz Treiber from Jasta 5 actually laid claim to the wreck of a ‘DH4’ (the Grub St corpus routinely takes ‘matching’ liberties with the types claimed) which came down north-east of Caudry at the rather precise time of 08.43 – also given as burned. What the Grub St corpus fails to tell the reader is that FlakBttr 206 & FlakBttr 557 also claimed an unspecified enemy machine which came down and burned at Troisvillers timed 08.45 – this is just 2km east of Caudry, which was south-east of Cambrai and about 8km north of Busigny. This can only reflect either the 11 Sqn Bristol or the 27 Sqn DH9 and effectively means we have three claims and credits for two losses. There are also claims by crews from 27 Sqn & 57 Sqn for two more Fokkers circa 08.45.

Quite frankly I would not put too much weight on the two claims by the 11 Sqn crew as being decisive, let alone reflecting the Jasta Boelcke loss (Ltn Hoffmann was lost WEST of Cambrai but annoyingly without a time making it near impossible to deduce who shot him down). I think it would be fair to say that inexperienced but eager aircrew always wanted to believe that machines they fired upon were shot down. Hindsight would suggest the first lone Fokker simply dived away once attacked from the rear, whilst the notion that 20 rounds could have set the second Fokker on fire is a little optimistic (MvR used to fire 10 and 20 times that many rounds in order to gain a genuine victory). What Kelty and the other Bristol crews undoubtedly saw falling in flames was one of the two missing RAF machines – this was a common misappraisal during the blur of combats; that crews on other machines wanted to believe that machines seen falling in flames were those of the enemy. But by the same token I would not blindly jump to accept the two Jasta 5 credits: as my 42 years of toil tell me that there was not a little taking credits for wrecks within the German claiming system, which not always came down as the result of enemy aerial action: but were lost over the German side due the misfortune of unseen collisions and wing failures, whilst Flak units invariably lost out to the pilots of the Jagdstaffeln in cases of disputed claims. In truth we have precious little worthwhile visibility in regards the vast majority of German aerial victories beyond the game-book listings, and which in my considered opinion have been far too readily accepted by modern authors as reflecting genuinely won aerial victories. Pointedly no one on the British side actually saw either of the two missing machines shot down by any Fokker. Josef Mai’s Flight Log survives but his entries are for the most part ambiguous – in regards his #30 all he provides is ‘ In the morning I downed a BF’ - not much to go on. Other than that all we know is that Mai was flying Fok DVII 898/18. .

I hope that that untangles the engagement a little bit.

Cheers & welcome

Russ

Hi Russ,

Sorry for the long delay in responding. Your post gave me a lot to ponder...plus I had some DIY jobs that took WAYYYY longer than expected.

As you can probably ascertain, I know next to nothing about German Army Air Service sources. Give me the RAF in Malaya/Burma/Singapore 1941-42 and I can give chapter and verse on sources, and bore for NATO in the process...but Great War German aviation? Not so much.

Even as I perused "The Sky Their Battlefield II" and "The Jasta War Chronology" the thought had struck me that many of the losses could have been attributed to Archie or machine malfunction rather than air-to-air kills. I'm not surprised that the AA units lost out when it came to claiming kills. The example of Richtofen falls into a similar category where, for decades, people argued over whether it was Brown or the Australian infantry who shot him down.

The detail about the Treiber claim and the inaccuracy of "The Jasta War Chronology" is particularly useful because 57 Sqn didn't lose any aircraft on that date, so his claim is obviously in error (unless he also attacked Smith's and Bromley's BF and simply mis-identified the aircraft type). It's disappointing that the Grub Street book includes such liberties. If you're going to change the documented record, then at least note that you've changed it with a footnote or something. Simply changing information based on a personal hunch does not make for good history, and it makes things even worse for numpties like me who are trying to understand, and want to trust, the available information.

I went back and looked at Peacock's and Kelty's service records and, as you point out, they were lacking in experience. Peacock only arrived in France on 31 Aug 1918 which, with squadron work-up, probably meant he only started operational sorties in mid-Sep. Kelty was even worse: he only arrived in France on 15 Sep 1918 so his operational experience was probably even less.

I suspected my analysis was overly simplistic. I do wish Mai had been flying his zebra-striped Fokker. Alas, we'll probably never know the markings worn by 898/18. It could easily have been a plain-jane with no personal markings.

Again, I do appreciate your insights, and for taking the time to provide such a comprehensive response to my question.

Kind regards,
Mark

R Gannon · 26 May 2022, 06:06 PM

Hi Mark,

Don’t be too hard on the Grub St corpus of the 1990s, the corpus actually reflect a huge step forward and we are all indebted to the various titles, but they reflect the wisdom of the 1990s and are not without their errors, as sorting out the WW1 air-war is anything but a precise science. A lot of work went into them, but it is now the 2020s and my gripe is that there are too many books being churned out in the present day which milk the 1990s the Grub St wisdom as if it reflects the final word and consequently the bar is not being set as high as it could be in regards what actually happened among the clouds.

Also don’t be too hard on Uffz Treiber; as airmen on both sides rarely witnessed the end results of their combats. In the harsh light of day I would suggest a great number of credits are in error, not in the least many of those accorded to MvR in the Grub St wisdom. The thing with German victory credits was that as the air-fighting was predominantly over their own territory and quite frankly they were left in possession of the evidence and it was possible to make that evidence read the way that some chose.

Here is a little speculation of my own: in recent times I have posted a lengthy thread here in Forum about ‘probable’ unseen collisions between British machines when over the lines: the likelihood overlooked because the wrecks have been all too readily seized upon as reflecting aerial victories of German pilots [who likely never saw the end results of their combats]. The loss of 11 Sqn’s F5814 & 27 Sqn’s D3172 might fit the bill of one such ‘unseen’ collision – with two machines down very close together between Caudry and Troisvillers and with fatal results. Pointedly no one on the British side actually saw either missing machine downed by any Fokker. As such it conceivable that Flak, who were always preparing Allied formations, took out the 11 Sqn Bristol which then ploughed into the 27 Sqn DH9 on the way down. Pushing the envelope a little further: it might be that Trieber was the pilot of the lone Fokker below the BF of Peacock & Kelty – possibly taking pot shots at the 57 Sqn DH4s hoping to cut one out and Mai might conceivably have been the pilot of the Fokker which dived onto their Bristol; possibly opening his throttle when bullets whizzed by and letting off a pall of black smoke as he took evasive action which eager but inexperienced airmen would want to believe was the prelude to a flamer. All of this was at 9,000ft and was probably not seen by Sgt Gamble at 17,000ft. If so, one might hazard that Mai & Treiber returned to their drome to fill out brief reports for a combat with a ‘BF’ and ‘DH4’ respectively where after telephone inquiries likely brought word of two burned wrecks east of Caudry and without too many questions being asked the dots were readily joined. Well that’s my considered appraisal.

Cheers Russ

Buffnut453 · 28 May 2022, 11:34 PM

Hi Russ,

Thanks for the additional insights. Frankly, I'm in awe of the work done by Norman Franks, Trevor Henshaw, Frank Bailey et al. Having spent some time trawling through original sources, I struggle to comprehend the level of effort involved to capture the details in these various books. It's also inevitable that errors creep in. However, my professional training is still screaming that authors really should distinguish between documentary facts and personal hyphotheses. I guess I'm innately greedy!

As noted in my previous post, I'm much more familiar with air combat during WW2. Even in that conflict, air combat claiming was still more art than science with significant over-claiming on all sides. I would never dream of criticizing an aviator because they have to make split-second decisions in high-threat environments. If you shoot at an aircraft and keep sight of it all the way down, then there's a very strong probability that you'll be following it because you won't see his wingman who'll shoot you down.

I tend to agree with your analysis about the likely causes of many losses. Mechanical/structural failures, mid-air collisions, and AAA all played their part and any could have caused the loss of an aircraft if its demise wasn't witnessed by other aircrew. On the 2 days of 3-4 Oct 1918, 11 Sqn appear to have lost 4 aircraft in mid-air collisions (although there are some questions about whether all aircraft belonged to 11 Sqn). That's 8 aircrew killed in 2 days just down to mid-air collisions. Given the lack of airspace coordination, the risk of collision must have been high, particularly when aircraft were congregating over specific areas of the front line.

I can't disagree with the theory you proposed in your last note, although i would observe that even if Jim Gamble noted 17,000ft in his logbook, it's entirely probable that he didn't remain at that altitude if his entire formation got caught up in a scrap with 5-6 Fokker D.VIIs. However, absent any more specific details, it's tough to be certain about anything related to the combat except that Jasta 5 was probably involved, and that Treiber and Mai were two of the adversary pilots.

Kind regards,
Mark

Gregvan · 12 June 2022, 09:37 PM

Hello Buffnut453,

Well, better late than never, but not much. Sorry, but I've been rather busy with family business. You asked about a photo of little Fritz Hoffmann of Jasta Boelcke. It has been published in Kurt F. Jentsch's book Jagdflieger im Feuer, Kriegserlebnisse eines Kampf- und Jagdfliegers beim Jagdgeschwader III, Jagdstaffel Boelcke u.a., (Karl Josef Sander Verlag,1937). More recently it appeared in Jasta Boelcke, The History of Jasta 2, 1916-1918 by Norman Franks (Grub Street, 2004). It also appeared in Osprey's "Aviation Elite Units No. 26", Jagdstaffel 2 'Boelcke' von Richthofen's Mentor - Osprey 2007, and no doubt elsewhere as well. Here it is. It was taken on the occasion of the party in celebration of Carl Bolle's Pour le Mérite in August 1918. From left to right: Gefr. Mynereck, Ltn. Otto Löffler, Fritz Heinz, Ltn. Fritz Hoffmann, Ltn. Eberhard Wolff Freiherr von Gudenberg (the OzbV, or adjutant), Bolle, Oblt. Kurt von Griesheim, Franz Clausenberg, Ltn. Gerhard Bassenge, Vzfw. Kurt F. Jentsch, and Ltn. Alfred Lindenberger. Jentsch wrote that the Staffel mechanics complained because of all the work they had to do to specially adapt the controls of Hoffmann's Fokker D.VII to his diminutive stature. However, "After dinner, Hoffmann sits down at the piano that stands in our mess' winter garden. It is a joy to hear him play - music diverts and relaxes."