Jagdgeschwader commanders - statistics

[Knusel]

Hi there gentlemen,

in WW1, there were 9 Jagdgeschwader commanders, who varied greatly in duration of command and scores of their JG's during their command.
This list ranks them according to the unit tally under their command divided by the duration of their command.

1. Wilhelm Reinhard 176 kills (75/month)
2. Oskar von Boenigk 146 kills (61/month)
3. Hermann Göring 186 kills (45/month)
4. Gotthard Sachsenberg 101 kills (43/month)
5. Bruno Loerzer 375 kills (43/month)
6. Rudolf Berthold 184 kills (34/month)
7. Manfred von Richthofen 274 kills (31/month)
8. Adolf von Tutschek 20 kills (14/month)
9. Eduard von Schleich 12 kills (9/month)

The reasons for the in part surprising ranks are open to debate.

Michael

[FliegerJG1]

Hmmmm....the first thing that occurs to me is that there were many variables that played into these figures. Location, location, location ........also the particular time of the war; the unit's equipment vs their opponent; staffing mix of experienced aces and novices and so on.

FliegerJG1

[Volker_Nemsch]

Hello!

As Flieger JG1 already said there were several variables. Among them were:

Time of the year:
There was less fighting in the air during wintertime. Cold weather, storm, snow etc. did not only reduce the numbers of the own flown missions, it also often was the reason that the enemy sent no aircraft on reconnaissance/artillery spotting/escort missions. Fewer enemies in the air meant fewer possible victories.

Chain of supply of material (aircraft and spare-parts):
Even the best German fighter units were rarely fully equipped with men and machines. Often there were not enough aircraft due to crashes/losses in combat/repairs. Having a spare aircraft was mostly a pure luxury and so the pilots often had to borrow an aircraft from comrades or they simply had to wait on the ground until a serviceable aircraft was available. In Germany there were considerable problems with the delivery of spare parts and engines what surely influenced the operational readiness.

Chain of supply of (new) pilots:
Occasionally even the best fighter units were not fully equipped with pilots. Some were on holiday, some were ill or were injured in combat or a replacement for a killed/wounded man had not arrived (In this connection it would be interesting if the “Spanish flu” had any influence).

Quality of the members of the unit:
For example during the summer of 1918 a German ace (Loewenhardt?) complained that the fighting and flying qualities of his men were very poor. Other units had the advantage that they had at least some experienced pilots on their list (that does not necessarily mean aces) so that within every flight there were one or two men with the needed “spirit”. An ace surrounded by beginners needs some time to “form” his unit into the desired operational readiness.

Availability of fuel and suitable lubricants:
During the second half of the conflict Germany faced considerable problems to produce enough high octane fuel for the units along the front. The situation became worse in 1918 – when capturing an enemy airfield a few dozen barrels of British fuel found on it were highly welcomed. Training units had to use a fuel of a rather lousy quality. Furthermore the hot summer of 1918 caused problems in those units equipped with rotary-engined fighters (the Voltol Ersatz for the not available castor oil was more or less pretty bad stuff and lead to a lot of additional maintenance work).

Types of own available aircraft and aircraft of the enemy:
Those units having the Fokker D.VII in mid 1918 were lucky. Others still had to fly the old Pfalz D.III(a) and Albatros D.V(a). Guess who had a better chance to shoot down more (advanced) aircraft. No all enemy aircraft were of the relatively outdated “F.E.2”, “R.E.8” and Sopwith 1 ½ Strutter” type in 1917/18. So the type of the aircraft used by the enemy was also of importance.

Tactics of the enemy:
If you have an enemy “coming to you” because of his aggressive doctrine (the British) this is certainly more favourabe for a Geschwadercommander than an enemy who also keeps an eye on the idea not to “waste” his men and material or who has a slightly more defensive approach to air war. Because then you often have to search for the enemy (probably without result) or he will take care to accept a fight only under more favourable for him.

Time of the war:
Certainly the chance to fight again enemy aircraft was best possible during the big German offensives in 1918. Then the enemy had to support the own troops at all cost and they had to risk much more to get urgently needed reconnaissance reports and photos. Furthermore there was the good chance to attack enemy aircraft, occupied with the task of ground strafing.

Location, location, Location:
It was not easy to become an ace next to the Swiss frontier or somewhere in Russia or the Balkans. And even over Flanders there were times when there were rarely any enemy flyer met during the missions or the fights ended without definite results (for example: 10. January 1918, 15. January 1918, 26. January 1918, 1. February 1918, 7. February 1918, 13. February 1918, 22. February 1918, 2.-3. March 1918, 7. March 1918, 19.-20. March 1918, 30. April 1918, 1. May 1918, 12. May 1918, and so on, and so on). On other days there was a long list of often more than 20 victories.

And the worst of all probably was ...
...that the pitiable fighter unit had to fly "an aircraft that had not produced aces"!

.

[Barry Hickson]

I found it fascinating that MvR ranked so low when J 11 was considered to be one of, if not the top Jasta?

[Knusel]

Dear Barry,

that was a surprise for me, too. The average monthly score of JGI under MvR's command was only nearly exactly the same as Jasta 11's monthly score from Jan till Jun 1917. I think the main reason is that the Albatros D.III was equal to his opponents of his time. The same cannot be said about his successor the Albatros D.V, neither about the Pfalz D.III. The Fokker Dr.I was rare and troublesome and when JGI received the Fokker D.VII at last, Manfred was dead.

Cheers,

Michael

[Frommherz]

How did you count the times when the respective commander was absent from the Geschwader?

One possible explanation for the low ranking of MvR is that he wasn't leading JG I for a considerable amount of time following his headwound on 6th July 1917. He himself was only able to score 6 victories in 8 months until he resumed scoring in earnest in March 1918.

[Knusel]

Dear Frommherz,

I'm glad you mention that very aspect because I have been thinking about it too. The close call with death in July must have been a gruesome experience for MvR and the last ten months of his life were reportedly spoiled by nearly constant head aches. I have the impression, that the incidence indeed impaired his achievement potential. The lucky strike of Cunnell and Woodbridge did not kill him but it might have saved the lives of many Allied airmen.

Sincerely,

Michael

[ONEALM]

I'm not sure this can be a linear assessment that has any real meaning. From the little analysis I've done (and it's very little), I suspect you'll see a hugh up-tick in victories once the D.VII arrives.

I'm not sure the command mad as much difference in this case as the machine. If th eunits had the Albatros D.V (for example) for their entire combat life the CO factor could probably be counted somewhat, but since they were changing aircraft, I'm not sure the list is quite as meaningful.

It's interesting, no doubt, but not sure it tells us much.

[Knusel]

I think, the key for the ranking is Black September in which the respective Fokker D.VII equipped JG's were commanded by the guys who rank 2-5. The guys who rank 6-9 commanded too early or too late to benefit from the very high scores generally achieved in that month. Reinhard's top rank remains unexplained.