French Aces?

[GilmoreDK]

After having read lots of pages about the British and German sides of the air war I am beginning to wonder about the French aces.
Aéronautique Militaire was a large air force, they had lots combat aircraft, and good ones too: All the Niuports, the excellent SPAD VII and the powerful S.XIII and not forgetting good two seaters like the Breguet 14 and the Salmson (off course also some very old and forgettable Farmans and the oudated Strutters).

But why is the there not more French aces?

Is it because the French sectors were more calm?
Is it because of a more cautious, less aggressive doctrine than say RFC/RAF?
Is it because of bad training or tactics?
Is it caused by a more strict system of claiming?

A combination of the above? Something else?

Of course they had Aces like the incredible René Fonck but the next in line (Guynemer) is coming in on an 11th place after droves of commonwealth pilots and a some germans. And then Nungesser and Madon far after that.

Off course this could also be British overclaiming, as some would claim but still?

Any good answers to this?

- Gilmore

[bristol scout]

Hi Gilmore,

If I had to be anything, I would like to have been a French pilot on the French front-----knowing that just 'up the line' there were hugely aggressive British and Dominion pilots and observers drawing the very best Germans to them because of that tenacity. Can't have made it harder for the French front, which after Verdun was not at all as aggressively fought over as the British front.

Indeed at the start of Verdun do Peuty emulated exactly Trenchards offensive strategy---the two men were very good friends with a superb working relationship. Into the fighting at Verdun the French high Command rescinded his offensive use of aeroplanes, instituting a defensive 'close support of ground troops' type role. The Germans took immediate advantage of this---until du Peuty overrode his commanders and went back to the Trenchard idea of offensive use of air power.

Ergo, Trenchard was vindicated---the offensive use was correct---though costly for the British ---who never really let up on it, but won the war, helped by it, in no small measure i think.

Cheers,
Dave.

[Pips]

Sadly there are not a lot of books published (in English) on French aces, nor on the activities of the Aviation Militaire in general. A great oversight IMO, which has created a skewed view of air warfare in general on the Western Front.

Some books that do address the issue of the Aviation Militaire, which are well worth reading, are:

* French Aircraft Of The First World War, by Soltan and Davilla. Although primarily concerned with the multitude of French aircraft, it provides an excellent description of the AM's organisation, policies, structure, politics, production and utilistaion of it's forces throughout the war years. Especially interesting is the opposed view between an offensive aerial arm (represented by the Groupe des Combat), and the Army Escadrilles. A bible in fact.

* War Over The Trenches, by E.R. Hooton. This is one of the best books published in recent years on WWI. Broad in scale (looks at all Air Forces) it analyses the effectiveness of all belligerent air forces, the policies and limitations placed upon them, and the actual effect they had on the ground war. A must read.

* Over The Front, by Norman Franks. Detailed listing of all French aces

*The Fighters, by Thomas Funderburk. Old book but a classic, with much rich detail on French aerial activities.

* Groupe de Combat 12 'Les Cigognes', by Jon Guttman. Detailed history of the most famous French combat wing - the equilavent (and forerunner) of the German JG 1.

* French Strategic and Tactical Bombardment Forces of World War I, by Rene Martel, translated by Allen Suddaby and edited by Steven Suddaby. The French pioneered both tactical and strategic bombing in WWI, as well as the development of aerial bombs, bomb-dropping mechanisms, bombsights, intelligence-based targeting packages, formation flying, night flying and navigation, long range fighter escorts, and aerial photography for bomb damage assessment. France not only supplied aircraft to virtually every Allied power in the war, but by the end of the war her air force routinely conducted raids consisting of 100 to 150 bombers against German troop concentrations. These massive raids occurred at a time when the British and Americans had difficulty mustering as many as three-dozen bombers to send against one target. This is a must have for anyone seriously interested in the Aviation Militaire.

[Old Man]

This is one of those things, Sir, where patterns of the ground war dictated the course of the air war.

The French army was fought out by the summer of 1917, and in a mutinous state, so French sectors from the collapse of the Neville Offensive till the German spring offensive certainly were quiescent on the ground, while English ground offensives pressed the Germans hard in Flanders during the last half of 1917.

It was also in this period, from the summer of 1917, that the air arms of the contending powers became major elements. The numbers of aeroplanes employed greatly increased, and so did the pace of operations. Thus, since the ground war was more active on the front where the English and the Germans confronted one another, this increasing scale and tempo of aerial operations had its greatest expression in fighting between the English and the Germans.

It is also true that, despite the common focus on elite fighter units like the Storks group, the French air service did not place nearly so much emphasis on fighter operations as the English, but instead emphasized the direct support of army operations. About half the escadrilles of the French air service were dedicated to close reconnaisance and artillery ranging, with less than a third being fighter units. The English proportions were just about the reverse.

[Barry Hickson]

Originally Posted by GilmoreDK

After having read lots of pages about the British and German sides of the air war I am beginning to wonder about the French aces.
Aéronautique Militaire was a large air force, they had lots combat aircraft, and good ones too: All the Niuports, the excellent SPAD VII and the powerful S.XIII and not forgetting good two seaters like the Breguet 14 and the Salmson (off course also some very old and forgettable Farmans and the oudated Strutters).

But why is the there not more French aces?

Is it because the French sectors were more calm?
Is it because of a more cautious, less aggressive doctrine than say RFC/RAF?
Is it because of bad training or tactics?
Is it caused by a more strict system of claiming?

A combination of the above? Something else?

Of course they had Aces like the incredible René Fonck but the next in line (Guynemer) is coming in on an 11th place after droves of commonwealth pilots and a some germans. And then Nungesser and Madon far after that.

Off course this could also be British overclaiming, as some would claim but still?

Any good answers to this?

- Gilmore

G'day Gilmore!
Mate the Osprey Aces Books covering Nieuport & Spad Aces give you a lot of info on many French Aces & Pilots. Definately worth adding to your Book collection.

[stevedrew]

Gilmore,

The definitive work on French Aces of WW1 is the two-volume set "Les "as" Francais de la Grande Guerre" by Daniel Porret (1983)
(Paris:Service historique de l'armee de l'air, Cedocar).
It has biographies, photographs, and victory lists for 193 pilots.

I purchased mine at Le Bourget Aerodrome in Paris, in the Musee de l'air et de l'espace, arguably one of the best museums in the world for early aviation (including WW1). You could seach Amazon and the usual sources, but I'm unsure whether it is sold elsewhere.

Sadly, it is entirely in French, but I can read a little bit of French, and it is certainly adequate for a non-French speaker to find the pilot they want information on, then it becomes a matter of typing the text into an online translation service or ask one of our French amis to translate for you.

[Froggy]

Bonsoir à tous


I dont know if French pilot were more or less 'agressive' than allied aviation..but I wonder if that the rules were the same. To have confirmation for victory, the French aviator must obtain the testimony of three independent people (excluding members of his own squadron), and determine the type of enemy aircraft and the place, date and time of combat. Also, a victorious pilot did not automatically receive confirmation for his victory, and the fact that the combat usually took place beyond the German front, made the presence of potential witnesses even more unlikely. While all the victories had declared an official existence, only those that can support a verification process were the subject of an entry in the military communiques, the others being considered "probable Germans behind the lines" This mode of operation gave sometimes drastic results with a large disparity between the number of victories registered and communicated with the number of victories claimed by the pilots
Does anyone know the rules to confirm victory for the other allies or enemies
?

Cordialement
Bruno

[jastaflieger]

regards jean navarre,
almost half of his confirmed victories would be tough to deny, as they represented german aircraft that were forced down behind French lines.
Bruno, mailed a copy of Navarre to you a few days ago, hopefully arrives soon for you! thanks again for all of your help!
jim

[xjouve]

Originally Posted by Froggy

Bonsoir à tous


I dont know if French pilot were more or less 'agressive' than allied aviation..but I wonder if that the rules were the same. To have confirmation for victory, the French aviator must obtain the testimony of three independent people (excluding members of his own squadron), and determine the type of enemy aircraft and the place, date and time of combat. Also, a victorious pilot did not automatically receive confirmation for his victory, and the fact that the combat usually took place beyond the German front, made the presence of potential witnesses even more unlikely. While all the victories had declared an official existence, only those that can support a verification process were the subject of an entry in the military communiques, the others being considered "probable Germans behind the lines" This mode of operation gave sometimes drastic results with a large disparity between the number of victories registered and communicated with the number of victories claimed by the pilots
Does anyone know the rules to confirm victory for the other allies or enemies
?

Cordialement
Bruno

You preceded me Bruno. IMHO, that's the main point. Most pilots, if not all of them, were very frustrated because of this system.

Apart from Fonck or Madon, the best example is possibly Dorme who AFAIK, reported 623h of flight, 120 fights, at least 63 victories (that's the number of claims I've been able to find), among which 'only' 23 were confirmed (Mortane and Daçay who studied Dorme's writings reported 50 probable victories, 43 certain victories and 23 confirmed victories). According to the letters he sent to his parents or friends, Dorme was really angry about that. He was indeed ambitious and wished to be the first. He was seen by his peers (both Brocard and Guynemer said that) as the best pilot of the Storks. Guynemer eventually said that Dorme used to shot down an enemy a day and apparently, if one look at both the confirmed and the probable victories, Dorme managed to have the fastest ratio of his squadron before been wounded in December 1916. He looked like obsessed with confirmation: when describing a fight in his letters, he used to conclude by "waiting confirmation", "not yet confirmed", etc. In 13 October 1916 he wrote to a friend, "as you saw, I've left the unofficial series". Interestingly, the matter with confirmation procedure was not the only point of frustration for pilots and Dorme is again a good example: he was first recommended for the Légion d'Honneur in early September, but the recommendation was lost somewhere... So a second recommendation was done in mid October. France always has problem with administration.

France loves being paradoxical. Funny think about Madon who claimed probably about 100 victories (I've been able to find 92 claims). He got 41 confirmed successes, but the monument built in his memory after his death by the French Army, stated this: "the Ace with 100 victories". Humm... Actually, it is not a matter with how many he really got, but why the French authorities acted so paradoxically? I think that maybe, aviation was commonly seen by military authorities as a very secondary army in which aviators were not serious fighters. That's probably why great pilots such as Heurtaux, Fonck, etc, were so grateful, even more than the popular feeling, to Pétain after WW1 because he was considered as the first General to have recognized aviation as a serious army. Anyway, just a parenthesis and not to be confused: Heurtaux led a resistance "réseau" in WW2 and Fonck, both being excellent friends, was linked to it. Heurtaux was captured and sent to Buchenwald, while Fonck has been arrested and eventually interned in Drancy camp.

Shortly after the war, Edwin Pearsons wrote an article about his life as an American pilot flying for France and the La Fayette squadron in which he remembered this story: Lowell once shot down a German aircraft over the right border of the Meuse River (Verdun sector). Two pilots of the Escadrille saw the victory along with a pilot from another squadron. Moreover infantry confirmed it as well. However, Lowell gave a time for the kill that was slightly wrong by 5 mins... and didn't get confirmation.

[Mystère]

Confirmation in the Aviation Militaire Belge was pretty much the same as that of the French Air Service.
If you look at the list of De Meulemeester's confirmed & unconfirmed victories, he could have ended the war with 30 victories instead of the 11 he eventually had.
two-seater pilot John de Roest d'Alkemade scored seven victories of which none was confirmed.

But on the other hand, De Meulemeester and his two wingmen refused to be credited with a victory that was proposed & confirmed to them by pilots of 204 Squadron on 25 April 1918. The RAF-pilots claimed an aircraft shot down between them and Belgian Hanriots, but De Meulemeester (& wingmen) were pretty sure that the German outmanouevred them skilfully & hedge-hopped away.
Conclusion of this combat: Capt Keirstead was credited, but the Belgians - in the end - weren't.