Ponts for discussion.

[alex_revell]

In a recent and scholarly book, the author makes the following statements.
Talking of the events of May 1917 and the activities of the Luftstreitkräfte during the month, he says.
‘while the Germans controlled the air over the Aisne valley, their fighters, contrary to Hoeppner's orders, rarely penetrated beyond the balloon line. The jastas' cut-and -run tactics made them less hunters than scavengers seeking easy prey rather than trying to disrupt the British air programme.'
Later, talking of the battle of Cambrai in November 1917, he says.
‘British generals later complained the Schusta were largely responsible for the collapse of their front line and that this was the largest concentration of low flying aircraft they had encountered. However, the 7 Staffeln had only 40 aircraft so the psychological impact must have been considerable'.

As they used to say at school: Discuss either or both of the above

The book is War over The Trenches. Air Power and the Western Front Campaigns 1916-1918 by E R Hooton. Highly recommended.

[YavorD]

My copy arrived two weeks ago but I had no time yet to read the book. I will be watching this thread, however.
Regards,
Yavor

[bristol scout]

Hi Alex, guy's,

Hooton is indeed a formidable historian, and it will come as no suprise to some here that I fully concur with the first part, and would immodestley go a tad further, and also doubt a bit the factual basis of the second part.

Very briefly-
I maintain that the Jastas NEVER disrupted British air programmes or strategy at all-- in the course of the war. Even in those dark Fokker fodder type day's, and in the equally dark early/mid April 1917 day's (dark but never black day's) the Corps machines carried out the vital art. obs. and reccon flights in spite of casualties----and a pyrrhic victory is still a victory.

As for the second part-
In the aftermath of a great shock after great elation (it had become easy to break in to a line but still impossible to break through) and much bell ringing in England (the Kaiser did much the same after the equally epochal seeming early victories of the March 1918 offensive awarding an Iron cross with Golden rays to Hindenburg---last awarded to Blucher in 1814) it is quite understandable that British Generals were looking for a 'new' reason for the success of the counter-attack. In a relatively small salient German ground attacks might well have seemed disproportionate but underlying the statement "The largest concentration" (40 ish aircraft) is an obvious and essential truth---they (the British) had never seen anything like it before!

Nor would they again, I maintain. By 1918----

Ground attack by aeroplanes, infiltration tactics, all arms attacks, integration of new weapons---the allies needed no lessons from their enemy in these disciplines----but massive numbers and foggy mornings---and depleted infantry holding too much line......well, you don't need specialised aeroplanes at all really, you have all the ingredients right there.

Dave.

[steven brown]

Gentlemen,
It seems to me that the Jastas never consistently entered British airspace because they were not willing to suffer the losses that such action would have entailed. In addition, they were understandably preoccupied with the British aircraft roaming their airspace.
What's important here is the fact that the RFC, regardless of losses raised aggressiveness to an institutional characteristic. This allowed the British to retain the initiative, keep the Jastas away from the lines and force a war of attrition, causing the weak resource base of the Germans to become critical. Confronted by a less tenacious foe, the German lack of material would not have been so critical.

[totalspoon]

The following is just my opinion. There are undoubtable mistakes and misconceptions in what I’ve written but so please correct any you see. Like most of us, I still have a lot to learn….

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Psyche of the German Fighter pilot and their defensive, anti-fighter stance is a fascinating subject as it dominates not just WWI but WW2 also.

The German defensive policy started with their very first dedicated fighter when the Fokker E.I crews were ordered not to cross the lines in order not to loose their technological advantage to the allies. When the tide of war swung to the allies in 1916, there’s no doubt that the defensive posture adopted by the Germans limited losses. The fact that the French Nieuports 17’s and Spad 7’s of late 1916 didn’t gain complete air superiority was due in part to these tactics. The first signs of trouble that would hinder the Germans for the next 30 years coincided with re-emergence of German air dominance with the arrival of the Albatross D Types. Now was the time for aggressive action to make the most of the advantage that the Germans held. While the Germans inflicted heavy losses on British in particular during the first six months of 1917, they never gained air domination, even over their own lines. Even during ‘Bloody April’, BE2’s continued to bring home the photos and direct the heavy guns. During early 1918, the pendulum once more swung to the British who aggressively pushed the air war deep into German territory. Here a new issue was first encountered where German fighters focused more on defeating enemy fighters than on stopping the more important enemy two seaters. Even Lothar noted that there was a lack of aggression in his elite squadron when it came to pressing attacks on two seaters. Despite the superior Fokker D.VII, the British continued to push the air war into occupied France during 1918. The British wing raids of the last six months showed exactly what air power could do when used with determination.

While the Germans defensive policy allowed them to destroy more aircraft than they lost during WWI, it did indoctrinate the German pilots with a mentality of defence. When situations demanded more, the German pilots found it impossible to overcome this now ingrained concept and were not up to the task. Orders to cross the lines and take the fight to the British during early 1917 were largely ignored while support for the ground troops during the do-or-die March Offensive was half hearted at best, an unfortunate case for the Germans where a bigger effort could have won the war. The British fighter pilot never forgot his role as support for the ground war, be that by destroying two seaters or straffing during attacks, while the German fighter pilots seemed to become more and more detached from what was happening on the ground.

The ultimate extrapolation of this concept was found in the Western Desert during WW2. Here, German pilots with vastly superior machines took a huge toll on allied fighters without ever affecting the ground war. Hans-Joachim Marseille was credited with 158 Victories but only two were bombers. During the critical battle of El Alamein, not one single allied bomber was shot down by German fighters. It was the final evolution of German WWI tactics, the complete separation of German Fighter pilots from the ground war.

Spoon

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Hi Dave:
Please read this all the way through. This is counter to what you believe, however you are incorrect. I am referring you to the British Official History of the Royal FLying Corps and the RAF. "WAR IN THE AIR", Volume IV, pages 258 and 259. H.A. Jones pays high tribute to the Schutzstaffeln and attributes the success of the German Infantry counter attack to the low flying aircraft of the Schutzstaffeln. It took the British infantry by surprise. To quote:
"The enemy low-flying attacks were very closely co-ordinated with the German infantry. The played a part in the success of the German counter-attack at Cambrai, but it should be pointed ouy that this form of low-flying attack was, at least in its scope, new to the British infantry so that part of its effect was due to the advantage of surprise."
They got whacked. The suggest of the Schutzstaffeln at Cambrai led to the Kreigspiel of November-December 1917 that led to the reorganization of the Schutzstaffeln into Schlachtstaffeln and a new mission role. They flew in co-ordinated flight and group formations. I suggest you read both those page and then read Schlachtfliger! you might be surprised.
Blue skies Dave,
Dan-San

[steven brown]

Totalspoon,
I really enjoyed your post about a psychological explanation of the Jasta behavior. I'm sure there's some truth to it and it may explain the curious disregard of Hoeppner's orders.
However in war, the actions of the opponent is also important and should not be ignored. In Spring 1918 there are many accounts of the Jastas penetrating French/American airspace, but there is nothing comparable on the British front. The RFC/RAF constant, aggressive intruding of German airspace forced the Jastas to conform to a tactical environment chosen by the British.
I agree with you that the actions of JG 27 and other German units in North Africa during 41/42 mirrored the Jasta tactics of WW1. One shouldn't generalize too much on the claims of one pilot however. British bomber losses were substantial during this period, and just as in WW1, the British used their single engined squadrons as ground attack.

[Dan_San_Abbott]

High Steven:
I would suggest you read the list of German aircraft that were shot down over Allied territory, you might be in for a surprise! A good deal of fighting took place over Allied territory throughout 1916, 1917 and 1918. For example how did Allied balloon get shot down 5 to 8 km behind the Allied lines on both the British and French Fronts. I am well aware of the Trenchard Airwar Plan to carry the Airwar to the German rear, this did happen, this forced the German air forces on the defensive, but not always. During the German Offensives of 1918, they held air superority in the first phases of these offensives. and the fight was not in the German rear areas, it was over the battle field and in the Allied rear areas, with the Schlasta flying in Gruppe formations and the Jagdstaffeln in support defending the air above the Schlastan, they were fighting over Allied territories.
Check out the Allied and German losses for the August 1918 on all fronts chart on page 67 in ATLAS OF AIR WARFARE, Alexander and Malcom Swanston, Fall River Press, New York, NY, Isbn:978-1-4351-1436-4.
Blue skies,
Dan-San

[steven brown]

Dan-San,
It's good to talk to you again, sir.
I realize that the Jasta patrols did cross the British lines, after all, I believe about 30% of British losses were on their side of the front and as you point out, all British balloon losses required it. I was speaking more generally. My point was that the British aggressiveness reduced these incursions.
Thank you for that book recommendation. I've never heard of it!! I'm still learning here and building my library.

[steven brown]

Dan-San,
I just ordered that book on Amazon. Thanks again.