The British Fifth Army March 1918: A 'Moral Collapse'?

Pete Hill · 30 May 2008, 08:23 AM

G'Day Forum Members

In 1976, in his landmark book, "The Face of Battle", British historian John Keegan, in his summary of the Battle of the Somme, examined the state of morale of the armies on the Western Front for the remainder of the war. In his opinion, it was in March 1918, that the British 5th Army, bearing the awesome impact of the Ludendorff Offensive, ..."collapsed, as much morally as physically..."
In his 1998 book "The First World War", Keegan writes in the chapter on the March Offensive on the 5th Army's performance...."Even though some British Battalions had given their all......they were the exception....The loss of ten infantry Lieutenant-Colonels killed testifies to the desperate fight put up by some units; but it is also evidence of the degree of disorganisation that it required commanding officers to place themselves in the front-line and, by setting an example to their stricken soldiers, pay the supreme sacrifice. Well-prepared units do not lose their senior officers in such numbers, even in the circumstances of a whirlwind enemy offensive, unless there has been a collapse of morale at the lower level....."
Keegan does acknowledge that the British Fifth Army was handicapped by factors outside of its control. Namely, it was, numerically, the weakest Army in the BEF. Its soldiers had suffered grevious losses in the previous year's Ypres Battle and most of the survivors had not had adequate rest or leave. Its commander, Hubert Gough, was already at that stage of the war, undergoing serious criticism for his conduct and was regarded as perhaps Haig's least-talented or able General. Another serious problem was the recent re-organisation of the 5th Army, made necessary largely by the emerging shortage of manpower, in which each Division's allocation of 12 Battalions was reduced to nine.
Many of the disbanded Battalions were in the Fifth Army and therefore all of the remaining units now had hundreds of new rankers, officers and staff joining them, all men who did not know each other and had never fought together before. The lengthy process of re-organising the Army into a co-hesive fighting force was still not completed by March, not helped by Gough's plodding Administrative leadership.
The 5th Army had only recently moved into the sector when the March Offensive began and many of the trenches, recently vacated by the French, were in a poor state. Gough was short of labourers for the work of improving his defences and many of his 40,000 workmen were recruited Chinese and Italians and too many of them were employed on making and repairing roads behind the lines. By the time the Germans struck, the 5th Army's trench-line was far from ready. It didn't help that the British had not yet had time to get to know the territory they were defending.
However, after outlining these facts, Keegan still states again what he said in 'Face of Battle' 22 years before, that the 5th Army's collapse was as much moral as it was physical.
Writer Saul David, writing in his book "Military Blunders" (1997), said (of the opening day of the March Offensive)..."it was one of the most spectacular successes of the war and due, in no small part, to the feeble defence put up by British troops..."
David then goes on to quote Martin Middlebrook from the latter's book "The Kaiser's Battle"..."It would not be an exaggeration to say that nine-tenths of the British Front-Line fell without much of a fight...."
However, Saul David is being deliberately selective in his choice of quotes here and that is a reason why he is a writer that I do not have a high regard for. I dislike Historians who present only the facts that support their wished-for conclusions and discard those that inconveniently don't. What David does not tell us is that Middlebrook is actually more ambigious and more reasonable throughout the rest of the book.

In "The Kaiser's Battle" (1978) Martin Middlebrook does, in his summing up of the fighting on March 21st, 1918, reluctantly come to the conclusion that many of the 5th Army's units suffered a ..."premature collapse of resistance in many places that day..".
He goes on to say that the BEF of 1914 would not have collapsed in such a way, nor would have the Kitchener Volunteers of 1916. In Middlebrook's opinion, the 5th Army of 1918 was more of a hybrid, a mixture of war-weary, exhausted veterans and reluctant new conscripts, all of them beginning to despair of seeing an end to the war. The morale and spirit of many units would have been weakened by the influx of new men from disbanded units.

However, Middlebrook does stress that the collapse of the 5th was understandable and the reason that he puts forth most strongly to support this is the Fog that enveloped the line on the morning of March 21st. He claims that this greatly aided the German advance and allowed the First-wave Storm-troopers to reach the British trenches more quickly and with fewer losses. Interestingly, Keegan , in his more recent book above, only briefly mentions this fog but to Middlebrook, it was the crucial factor in the breaking of the British Lines.
Another reason Middlebrooks puts forth is the historical tactics of the British Army, namely that they prefer to fight in line, each man bolstered by the security of the close promixity of his comrades on either side of him. The sketchy defences on March 21st meant, however, that many of the British defences were isolated outposts which were vulnerable to flanking attacks. In the dense fog and smoke, and with the loss of officers and rapid breakdown of the already slow and primitive communications, those outposts would have rapidly become very lonely to their occupants. And Middlebrook is not the first historian to suggest that the typical British soldier is not inclined to fight well if there is no officer to tell him what to do.
Middlebrook also argues that soldiers of Western Democracies cannot be reasonably expected to fight to the bitter end, especially men who have already given so much. Men who fight hard and inflict heavy casualties on attackers often doom themselves to instant execution when they eventually stop fighting and try to surrender. Many defending soldiers are un-comfortably aware of this and prefer to surrender immediately or only after putting up a token resistance so as not to provoke too much anger from their captors. This has occured in many other conflicts. In the closing days of the Great War, there were cases where German machine-gunners firing at advancing Allied soldiers were shot in the back by their comrades who wanted to surrender and didn't want to have to do so to attackers wanting revenge. On the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863, a large number of Union soldiers deliberately aimed high and fired over the heads of advancing Confederates so if the former had to surrender, their captors wouldn't have dead comrades to avenge.

Its now after 1am so I had better stop for the night.
Fellow forum-members, please delay your comments until I get a chance to finish this tomorrow. Stayed tuned for Part 2 !
regards Pete.
Oh no, my son has just woken up again. Better dig out that Wiggles dvd!

Pete Hill · 30 May 2008, 08:01 PM

Part 2

In his book "1918: The Year of Victory" (1998-Imperial War Museum series), Malcolm Brown acknowledges that small, isolated groups of 5th Army Infantry fought hard on the morning of the 21st but ..."for vast numbers of the units of the Fifth Army, the only course was, in brief, to live to fight another day.."
Brown then quotes a description by a British officer named Ledward of the subsequent retreat;- ..." The troops were walking down a main road. They were in no formation and units were mixed up in a strange confusion. Officers and Men were together and it was just a rabble, but there was no panic.....just a steady slogging towards the rear."
Ledward and another officer then tried to rally the men and form a defensive line but, as he wrote, ...."You might as well have tried to stop the sea. We did get a line of sorts, but it melted away the moment your back was turned..."

Richard Holmes, in his book "The Western Front" (1999)- he writes of the Fifth Army's performance, describing how Boadicea redoubt fell with the capture of a Lieutenant-Colonel, 241 men, 41 Machine-Guns, three Captains, seven Subalterns and a small white dog! Holmes then wryly comments "This sort of thing was scarcely last-ditch defence..."
Holmes then quotes a bitter comment from a nameless Sargeant..."I must confess the German Breakthrough on 21st March 1918 should never have occurred. There was no cohesion of command, no determination, no will to fight, and no unity of companies or of battalions."
Holmes then describes how Captain McMurtrie of the Somersets had to draw his revolver to prevent his retreating men breaking into a panic-stricken run.
However, like Middlebrook and Brown, he is at pains to point out how isolated groups did put up stiff and sometimes fierce resistance, delaying the German advance and inflicting heavy losses on the precious Stormtroopers.

Lyn MacDonald in her 1998 book "To the Last Man: Spring 1918" emphasizes the sheer speed and surprise of the German assault on the morning of the 21st. She gives the impression that the attack came so suddenly and skilfully, that many British troops were overwhelmed even before they knew what was happening. She describes how one group of British Infantry were having a brew-up in their dugout when their Captain stuck his head in and calmly informed them to come out, adding "You won't want your rifles". The men emerged to find themselves surrounded by Germans. The trench outpost had been quietly and quickly flanked on both sides without the occupants even noticing. The men had of course earlier on experienced the severe artillery bombardment but the dense smoke and fog had been so thick, they couldn't see anything and since there was no frontal attack on their position so the Captain had ordered them into the dugouts to have something to eat.
MacDonald describes how another group of English soldiers were sheltering in their dugout when a stick bomb came tumbling down the steps. The occupants rushed out the other end of the dugout only to be confronted by fifty armed Germans pointing weapons at them.
Another group was engrossed in a card game when a bullet was fired into the ground at their feet and they looked up to see two Germans standing over them with pistols.
MacDonald emphasizes the fog as a crucial aid for the German advance and one of the main reasons for the rapid collapse of the British line. However she also adds that it also hindered the Germans as it disrupted communications, narrowed visibility and the still air slowed poisonous gas in dissippating, causing some casualties to the attackers as well as the defenders. In the thick mist, the advancing Stormtroopers had difficulty picking their way over the shell-torn ground and some British strongpoints were overlooked, thus causing severe losses to be inflicted on the following waves which ran into them.
She describes the sometimes heroic stands made by isolated groups of the 5the 5th Army but these were exceptions rather than the rule. MacDonald's explanation is;- "The age at which a man could be conscripted for military service had recently been lowered to 18, and raised to 42. Rigid medical standards had been relaxed, and recruits were no longer rejected on grounds of height, or because they had bad teeth. The standard of robustness had dropped, and in some cases the hardships of war service had affected even the fittest..."

In his book "Forgotten Victory" (2001), Gary Sheffield, however, argues that Field-Marshall Haig knew that the 5th Army was the weakest of his formations and deliberately placed them in the vulnerable Somme sector because if the attack fell there, they could afford to give up territory unlike in the Ypres sector to the North. In fact, Sheffield also suggests that the Germans should have concentrated their blow on the Ypres sector as it would have brought them within striking distance of the coast more quickly.
Regarding the performance of the 5th Army, Sheffield only briefly skims over the fighting of the 21st and instead focusses on the German failure to reach their objectives on the first day and the less successful assaults on the British 3rd Army. He also offers the same reasons for the breaking of the 5th Army's lines as Middlebrook- namely that the 5th Army was numerically weak and British soldiers fight better in line, rather than in scattered outposts. Sheffield also argues that after being on the offensive for 2 years, the BEF had become stale in defensive tactics.

Finally, Hew Strachan in his recent book "The First World War" (2007) lays blame on the British 5th Army's headquarters rather than on the men themselves. As the first line cracked, Strachan argues that HQ 'over-reacted' and became 'paralysed' with Gough issuing confused orders. The result was, Strachan believes, that even though the German gains on the first day were less-than-hoped for, their advances on the following days were much greater due to the dis-organisation of the British Command which caused their men to concede ground more quickly than they needed to.
Like all of the previous writers, Strachan then describes the declining strength of the German advance over the following days as casualties grew and men increasingly stopped to loot and plunder the Allied supplies. German infantrymen gorged themselves on luxuries they had not eaten for years- white bread, fresh milk, corned beef, sugar and chocolate, along with better-quality cigarettes.

I welcome forum member's comments.
regards Pete.

NeilE · 31 May 2008, 09:55 AM

Hi Pete

Ah let the games begin!

Firstly let me preface this post with the statement that I dislike Keegan and his work... I haven't read the one you quote as I gave up reading his works sometime before that one was published. I have always felt that Keegan answer to many of the problems he analysed would have been giving out a "demmed good thrashing" to the lower ranks ala Wellington and have found little of worth in much of his work.

A second statement: My Maternal Grandfather was captured on or about March 21 1918, when positions of the 2nd Battalion 8th London Regt (2nd Post Office Rifles) was overrun and/or surrounded on the extreme eastern flank of the Fifth Army's position. Grandfather was gassed (most likely during the opening bombardment) and the after-effects of this led to his premature death in 1954, some years before I was born.

The British defeat on March 21 1918 was hardly due to a morale failure as an isolated phenomena, centred on the lower ranks. It was certainly a failure of many factors but I don't see that as one of them.

Many of the authors you mention touch I think on some of the reasons for the retreat but not one of them nails it in its entirety I think.

Let's get rid of an absurd proposition first, as this adds nothing of substance to the discussion.

Quote:

In his book "Forgotten Victory" (2001), Gary Sheffield, however, argues that Field-Marshall Haig knew that the 5th Army was the weakest of his formations and deliberately placed them in the vulnerable Somme sector because if the attack fell there, they could afford to give up territory unlike in the Ypres sector to the North. In fact, Sheffield also suggests that the Germans should have concentrated their blow on the Ypres sector as it would have brought them within striking distance of the coast more quickly.
Regarding the performance of the 5th Army, Sheffield only briefly skims over the fighting of the 21st and instead focuses on the German failure to reach their objectives on the first day and the less successful assaults on the British 3rd Army. He also offers the same reasons for the breaking of the 5th Army's lines as Middlebrook- namely that the 5th Army was numerically weak and British soldiers fight better in line, rather than in scattered outposts. Sheffield also argues that after being on the offensive for 2 years, the BEF had become stale in defensive tactics.

Quite frankly as mentioned above, this is nothing but an absurdity. In his haste to revise the history and boost the standing of Haig, Sheffield ignores some basic points, and reveals his ignorance of some basic history and strategy at the same time. Firstly, Haig certainly did not set the Fifth Army up as some sort of sacrificial lamb in order to soak up the German's offensive. British Intelligence certainly knew the most likely site for the coming offensive would be The Somme Valley: Gough certainly knew it and repeatedly told Haig as did Byng. Gough pointed out to Haig that large quantities of support troops and labourers were needed to prepare the defensive positions to the rear but the High Command sent too little too late and mis-deployed a fair proportion of these building an unnecessary light railway line in the area. Haig's replies to Byng and Gough were such that he believed that their defences were adequate to hold off the Germans. He certainly had no intention of giving up that ground lost in the retreat. All of the above is well documented - I'm not sure what sources Sheffield used to support his position but it would have to be a very selective reading to come up with that proposition.

His observation that the Germans should have attacked at Ypres is a witless observation. If the Germans had attacked at Ypres, it would have left significant Commonwealth forces on its flank and rear able to remain in contact with the French, and with a line of withdrawal southwards if needed. It would also have been well possible for these forces to launch attacks against the German's flank. Furthermore the actual salient was in a relatively strong state of preparedness with the First Army quite well entrenched in the actual salient area. Also it should be remembered the ground was still terrible in the Salient and not suitable for a large scale attack ala the 21st March Offensive. This is borne out by the German decision to launch the Georgette offensive to the East of Ypres rather than directly at the salient. Whilst important ground was lost in Georgette, it ultimately was far less successful than Michael with its major thrusts stopped at Hazebrouck, Mt Kemmel and by the Belgians at Kippe. These results ultimately show up Sheffield's proposition as essentially wrong-headed. Furthermore the British had not 'become stale' in relation to defensive tactics - the truth more like is that they never gave them sufficient thought at any time. British thinking at higher levels regarding defensive deployments were always inadequate, as they did not suit the dominant doctrines of the High Command. Anyway enough of the apologist Sheffield!

Back on The Somme, several reasons are advanced as to why the British crumbled; firstly they were used to fighting in line... this was so perhaps but this was not an inherent weakness but a failure of training. As I have said before British training in 1918 was essentially the same as it was in 1914. Haig's Infantry Field Manual of 1909 still held sway despite it being a totally antiquated way to prepare troops, with its emphasis on advances in line and discouragement of individual movement, small group tactics, and the individual initiative of the average Tommy. When placed into positions, such as strong points requiring small group action and movement they may not have handled it overly well, in comparison to, say the Australians at Hazebrouck and Dernancourt, who took to it 'naturally'. Much has been made of the physical condition of the new recruits drafted to the Fifth Army. I think that this is less of a factor than it has been made out to be. Many of the draft of 1918 were young men of eighteen or nineteen and many were in top physical condition for their age. The older recruits may have been a different story, given that older recruits were well known not to able to stand up to the rigours of warfare in The Great War.

I have not seen what the overall numbers of new recruits to old hands were in the Fifth Army. The old hands were veterans of the Somme and Third Ypres, and whilst they were most likely physically and mentally tired, they were seasoned troops who knew how to fight. What is more likely is the new recruits were ill prepared by poor training, which left them intellectually and physically unprepared for battle.

Counter to this, we need also to examine the physical condition of the German troops also. Whilst the Stormtruppen were the best troops drawn from the German forces and made into effective units. Many of the other troops were in much poorer condition. Many of the troops from the eastern Front were in poor physical condition after enduring years of poor diet on that front. Furthermore, the Germans already used up a significant part of the draft of 1918, and by March 1918, were strengthening units with recruits from the older part of the draft of 1919 - which meant that some of the troops were even younger than those of the British and with a higher proportion of aged recruits as well. Essentially this meant that both sides had to deal with more fragile personnel - I suspect though that age had little bearing on performance with the key factor being training or the lack of it. There had always been under-age or younger soldiers in front-line units throughout the war with no noticeable effects on earlier battle outcomes as a result. What did was the poor training standards and he minimal application of these towards the drafts sent to the Fifth Army in early 1918.

I certainly agree with you Pete regarding the potential for negative effects caused by the re-organisations and rationalisations carried out in early 1918. These certainly would not have helped the situation.

When looking at the 21st of March, much is made of the British collapse as a stand alone phenomena. However it can't be understood without an understanding of the real key factor, the offensive tactics and preparation by the attacking Germans. Firstly the barrage: Bruchmuller's Feurwaltze was one of the best prepared artillery barrages in history, if not the best. Much research had been done by the Germans into the targets for the various parts of the barrage. When it hit, the accuracy was outstanding, disrupting command and communications, destroying any chance of a successful counter barrage and finally pasting the front lines in an absolutely ferocious barrage that destroyed entire portions of the British front line. Plus it was a careful mix of high explosive, gas and shrapnel designed to cause maximum disruption to its various subjects. Furthermore it was individually tailored almost to its particular targets, with different mixes for the artillery to that used on command and communications etc.

Experienced French troops, who experienced similar barrages at Mt Kemmel described them as the worst they ever experienced, far worse than anything they experienced in the hell of Verdun.

Continued Next Post

NeilE · 31 May 2008, 09:56 AM

Continued From Above Post

Given all that that it was no surprise that large sections of the British Front collapsed, allowing the Sturmtruppen a relatively easy passage through the front line. The following troops had little trouble isolating the various units and strong points that held on, most of which had surrendered or been destroyed by the end of the first day. The German tactics were designed for maximum penetration and disruption and to that end they were remarkably successful in Western Front terms. The favourable weather conditions of heavy fog also played a key role early on in the battle.

Much has been made of Gough's incompetent leadership, leading up to, on, and after the first day. There is no doubt that Gough was not an overly talented general. He was certainly not the worst of the British generals - there were many who were worse (Hunter-Weston and Butler are two that come to mind). I do think that the majority of his divisional commanders were of a lower standard than those in both the Ist and 3rd Army, and their inability to respond adequately and relay information to Gough certainly exacerbated the situation. Gough had communicated to Haig, the poor state of his positions (such as the non-existent Green Line) prior to the commencement of the battle but Haig did little or nothing to assist him, pointing out that he could rely on significant support from the French reserves (which totally failed to eventuate). He also requested additional artillery support, pointing out the poor physical state of his artillery pieces after 3rd Ypres, however once again Haig declined to provide any assistance. These failures of Haig's and the High Command's to bolster Gough's obviously undermanned (his manpower was nowhere near adequate to cover the frontage they had been given) positions was whitewashed in the subsequent inquiries, with Haig disingenuously blaming Gough for a situation he had played a significant part in creating. Basically Gough did not get the support he asked for because Haig and his command could not conceive that the Germans were capable of delivering the blows they did and in the manner they did. There is some evidence that Haig was expecting the usual old style of offensive that would be driven off in the usual way. And how wrong they were!

Haig did have some reserves that could have been transferred to Gough's front (Haig apologists usually blame Lloyd George for the manpower shortage - pointing at his sensible decision to withhold some of the drafts of 1918 from France - after Haig and the High Command's profligate wastage of the drafts of 1916 and 1917 at Third Ypres and the Somme, I see this as a sensible decision as it hamstrung Haig's plans to launch yet another offensive in the salient in 1918), which Haig kept close to his headquarters, and did not release until late in the battle despite both Gough and Byng, calling for their earlier release. If brought under Fifth, or even Third Army, control earlier in the piece, they may have played an important role in stemming the German advances. As it was they were released too late to make much of a difference in the campaign's outcome.

In the ensuing days, the fluidity of the situation made positive generalship almost redundant. Retreating troops were not where they were reported to be, due to further withdrawals, poor communications, and even inaccurate mapping played a part. A very useful book on the British retreat is William Moore's "See How They Ran". This little known work, published in 1970, examines the British retreat from a number of levels - from interviews with Gough (who was still alive at the time of its writing) to the experience of the ordinary soldier, it is a useful work on the subject. What it does show is that once it started the retreat became almost inevitable, units separating, basic communications fraying, and the difficulty of finding consistent defensible positions. The retreat was probably less of a complete rout of all quarters (though in parts it was) but was also at times a series of very brave, sometimes futile, and at times very effective rearguard actions. A common occurrence was for units to make a stand to hold the advance only to find themselves outflanked because of other units withdrawing or because there were no other units on their flanks. Still many of these rearguards inflicted quite heavy casualties on the Germans, often losing their specialist troops in the process of the attacks.

Another factor in the German's effectiveness at this time was their ability to move their heavy artillery up quickly. Many of the German attacks post 21 March also featured remarkably heavy opening artillery barrages. The Germans also showed that, as well as their superior planning on March 21, that their abilities to organise the following advances as 'hot pursuits' was also exemplary.

Another factor in the British failure was the poor quality of many of its junior officers. Memoirs from experienced ANZAC junior officers such as Joynt VC, noted a number of times the poor quality of leadership of British junior officers at times and its disorganising influence on the capacity of the men they led to resist the German attacks.

Some authors like to contrast the supposedly better performance of Byng's Third Army to that of the Fifth Army as a means of blaming Gough and even the men under his command. It must be noted though that the artillery barrages on the Third Army frontage were neither as intense as those for Fifth Army, nor were the levels of manpower employed by the Germans the same either. The Third Army's positions were better prepared and in greater depth, which assisted their performance also. This better preparation, at least for a time anyway, kept third Army communications more intact and enabled a more centralised response from Third Army's command structures. Whilst some Third Army units were able to mount relatively successful defences for a time, there were others that broke as severely as Fifth Army units did.

There is no doubt that some German troops did loot and discipline did break down at times but I believe this is sometimes overstated. There was little sign of breakdowns of German discipline at Dernancourt or Villers Bretonneux, apart from that brought about by the (primarily) ANZAC forces in those actions.

Finally then the defeat on March 21 and the subsequent retreats can be seen as being brought about by the intersection of the German's methods in attack, the weather, and a series of failures at a number of levels of command, down to the poorly prepared British infantry, who were ill trained and outnumbered to be able to resist the intensity of the attacks they received. Communications broke down, leading to break downs in the chain of command and the ability for Gough relay orders relevant to the withdrawing positions of his forces. In spite of some inspirational individual examples to the contrary, command broke down at times from Division on down to junior officers with disastrous consequences creating situations which the antiquatedly trained Tommies were not able to deal with - and which at times led to routs developing. It should be noted that in some examples where retreating British units became attached to ANZAC formations, they performed very well, as a result perhaps of the positive examples of the will to fight, individual initiative, and the intelligent in the field leadership the Australians mostly enjoyed from their junior officers.

Keegan's enjoinder regarding 'morale collapse' as an individualised phenomena therefore to me seems wide of the mark, and seems to blame the most helpless actors in the drama for the situation. I have attempted to show that the cause of the failures was due to a timely intersection of a wide number of factors from many levels and sites. I doubt whether Keegan's implied 'demmed good thrashing' of the 'disloyal' lower ranks would have done any good at all. Keegan has never been one to centre the study of warfare on the actual participants, preferring broad brush and intellectualised constructs to explain history, thus disregarding the pressures of the moment on the individual participants.

Hopefully this isn't 'the last word' in this thread as there is a lot more to be said on this topic on many levels.

Cheers

Neil

NeilE · 5 June 2008, 02:58 PM

Hey Pete, between us we must have nailed this one...

Pete Hill · 6 June 2008, 05:08 AM

Hi Neil,

maybe you are right! Although my first post on the Anzacs took a while to warm up in terms of contributors so maybe more are coming to this one, too. Maybe my post isn't controversial enough. Next week's post: "Albert Ball & Lady Haig: secret lovers?" (Just kidding!)
Thanks for your very detailed and very well-researched and articulate reply. Nice to converse with some-one else who values good grammar and who doesn't mind if a sentence is longer than 4 words.
I agree with all you said and I do believe that the collapse of 5th Army had a lot more to do with a failure of the system and its preparation rather than of individuals (Gough) and the units as a whole.
I think Gough was used as a convenient scapegoat but I think that he cannot shoulder the blame alone and many of the flaws of 5th Army were flaws that were a feature of both the British army and the entire military of the era as a whole- insufficient training, not enough attention paid to logistics, supply, communication and organisation. There were certainly things that Gough could have done better but then hindsight always knows best! The 5th Army was a force that had been sorely tested for a long time and in conditions that armies have never experienced elsewhere before or since, something that too many historians fail to understand. So much about the Great War was entirely new, untried and unique in terms of experiences, circumstances and conditions. I can't help wondering how men like Wellington, Marlborough, Washington or Frederick would have faced up to the conditions of a war like WW1? A war that didn't allow much room for movement, dashing manouvres, rapid and clear-cut results.
As Gough found out, scapegoats are very handy to officialdom. As Napoleon said, "Victory has a thousand fathers but defeat is an orphan." Like Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbour or Lord Cardigan at Balaclava, Gough was such a convenience whereas the real blame lay with the system as whole.
I don't think I personally agree with Martin Middlebrook's unfavourable comparison of the 5th Army, saying that the BEF of 1914 would never have collapsed in such a way. From what I have read, after the battles of Mons and Le Cateau, some units of the BEF did, however, fall apart in a very un-seemly fashion. One description has retreating Soldiers disorganised and milling or lounging about a town square, many of them tossing aside their weapons or looting houses and shops to desperately find water or booze. And, it should be pointed out, these men were seasoned Regulars, many of whom had spent all their adult lives in the Army and were highly trained professionals. And, just as importantly, these men had only spent a few weeks on a war-footing, having only just recently arrived from the UK. They were fit, fresh and their clean uniforms were free of lice. Trench foot, constipation, dsysentry, filthy uniforms, rats, these things were still in the future for the BEF, unlike the 5th Army who knew these conditions as daily facts of life.
They had not had to endure months of misery in cold, water-logged trenches, nor days and days of relentless artillery bombardments like the experienced men of the 5th Army had had to. For the men of the BEF at the end of August, 1914 when the 'Great Retreat' began, their experience of battle was limited to a few days.
Regarding Gary Sheffield, yes I agree he is a historian with an axe to grind and he sometimes doesn't let facts get in the way of his wishful thinking. Another historian whom I feel is also guilty of such is English writer Robin Neillands. I have read 4 of his books- "Normandy 1944", "Great War Generals", "Bomber Offensive" & "The Old Contemptibles: BEF 1914". His axe to grind is that the British army has been criticized and maligned far too much and, regarding Normandy, far too much credit has been given to the Americans at the expense of their British allies. But, like Sheffield, he sometimes uses selective quotation and manipulates material to suit the desired thesis.
Re: John Keegan, I think that his 'Face of Battle' is a classic and a landmark work in military writing as it changed the way historians looked at warfare. But none of his books since have come close in importance and quality. His larger work, which he clearly intended as another landmark, 'History of Warfare" was, though a fine read, flawed with some over-generalizations and shallow arguments. Keegan tried to be a bit too ambitious and spread himself too thin with such a sweeping, broad-scale work. "Face of Battle' worked far better as he focussed on certain events- Agincourt, Waterloo & the first day of the Somme. However, one aspect of that book has dated badly, his very optimistic predictions for the future of now seem sadly naive given the events since 1976. Likewise that writer who wrote that famous "End of History' essay back in 1992.
Of course an important point I didn't raise was that the German army's successes of the first week of the March Offensive were short-lived and the fifth Army made a respectable recovery and fought back much more effectively during the follow-up period. However, many historians since have focussed on the first few days and it was the initial collapse of the 5th Army that has lodged more firmly in people's memory, creating an overly slanted view of the British army in 1918. This popular view is one of an army deeply flawed and ultimately un-successful. One could be forgiven after reading many history books of the war in thinking that the German army defeated itself in 1918.
Likewise the popular views of Balaclava or the Tet Offensive of 1968. Regarding the former, everyone remembers the Charge of the Light Brigade but no-one remembers the highly successful charge of the Heavy Brigade or the equally successful defence of the Highland Infantry Brigade (The thin red line). With the latter, it was the initial shock and surprise of the opening days of the Tet Offensive that people remember but much less well-known is the defeats inflicted on the Viet Cong and NVA over the following weeks. (The Viet Cong never recovered from the massive losses they suffered and their contribution to the rest of the war was much smaller). Tet was a military failure for North Vietnam but in terms of propoganda and political morale, it was a crucial victory as it was the opening surprise/shock of the Offensive that lodged most firmly in the minds of the Western public. One could argue that, despite their ultimate victory in 1918, the opening days of the March Offensive dealt a severe blow to the credibility and reputation of the British army in the minds of many historians and commentators. It is a major reason why the eventual successes of the British army in 1918 remain largely forgotten.
There is a gaping hole in our understanding of the campaigns of 1918. You have the March Offensive with the Allies reeling back in disarray and then all of a sudden, the Germans surrender. What happened in between? Some, but not enough historians have examined this in adequate depth although numbers are improving. But not enough to change the popular perception of the war. No wonder, even today many Germans still believe the 'Stabbed in the Back' theory of why they lost the Great War.
Regards Pete

alex_revell · 6 June 2008, 06:45 AM

Just a quick, maybe inconsequential point. When I was a teenager my father had two friends, brothers, who were in 5th Army and were there at the time. They both had warmest feeling about Gough and always refered to him as 'our General'. This was in direct contrast to their opinion of Haigh. I only wish now that I was interested in WW1 at the time and could have questioned them about events.

R Gannon · 6 June 2008, 06:44 PM

Pete & Neil

As usual I only just stumbled on this thread. Good one. Neil I've long had 'See How they Ran' by More - In my view it gives the best picture of the spring battles. I feel retreat is too misleading - fighting withdrawl would be more appropriate. I'll get back to you guys with a little observation of my own.

Cheers Russ

NeilE · 6 June 2008, 08:54 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by alex_revell

Just a quick, maybe inconsequential point. When I was a teenager my father had two friends, brothers, who were in 5th Army and were there at the time. They both had warmest feeling about Gough and always refered to him as 'our General'. This was in direct contrast to their opinion of Haigh. I only wish now that I was interested in WW1 at the time and could have questioned them about events.

An interesting observation Alex. After the war Gough worked hard to restore the name of the Fifth Army and was often publically critical of Haig and the High Command because of their treatment of 5th Army, before, during, and after the offensive, (it was disolved after the offensive) and the units that made it up. Units were broken up and mates were scattered - a cause of some bitterness later on. Gough was of course attempting to restore his good name post war but many Fifth Army veterans looked upon him kindly for his efforts in that regard. Mind you that was a post war view of him as the same troops may not have had such positive regard for him during the war as Gough was notorious as a "Thruster" who pushed offensives forward long after any possibility of strategic advantage had disappeared, and whose tactical thinking never went far beyond the frontal offensive in the traditional manner.

Regards

Neil

retread · 6 June 2008, 09:12 PM

While I do not have the in depth understanding of March, 1918 displayed in this thread I have read a decent amount regarding it and cannot resist contributing my impressions for whatever they are worth.
I think "morale" or probably more accurately war weariness did play its part during the "Kaiserschlact" in this sense. A well planned offensive on the Western Front executed in 1918 had a significantly greater chance of success then a well planned offensive at some earlier point of the war. With the tremendous effort and cost in lives the conflict had extracted from all involved certainly the populations of the opposing nations were examining more critically and with less satisfaction what it was all about (I AM aware of the understatement). If you look at warfare as a giant competiton you recognize the pattern. Whether its a game of chess or a boxing match or a game of ice hockey ( the more intense the more obvious) there is a point when evenly matched , determined opponents will have reached a mental and physical wall. At that point he who can find it within himself to sieze the initiative will likely come up the victor. This is simple attrition and will, intelligent planning being assumed (or at least planning comparable to your "equal" opponent). I believe the German and Empire forces were matched very evenly, each displaying determination (stubbornness), strength, weakness, wisdom or the lack of it in equal measure.
Germany did sieze the initiative in March , 1918 and as noted made gains that were outstanding by the standards of the Western Front. With both Germany and the UK being at the point of exhaustion a hard blow by either at that time was likely to have a telling effect. That British forces were able to absorb it and stalemate the German offensive at all tells me they still had as much fight left in them as their opponents.
I have recently read "The World Crisis 1911-1918" by Winston Churchill, and it is a brillant book. In it Churchill makes the statement that one of the great miscalculations Germany made during the war was their 1918 offensive. In this I humbly (very humbly) disagree. I disagree for the reason the Germans recognized themselves. America was in the war and for Germany in the spring of 1918 it was now or never. Churchill was usually quick to recognize that wars are not fought on a military level alone, but on political and social fronts as well. This was normally one of Germany's blind spots, sacrificing " the moral highground" for military necessity.
If Germany had husbanded it forces freed from the Eastern Front it still almost certainly would have been crushed if not in 1919, then 1920. With a U.S. population of between 120-130 million it is not an exaggeration to imagine the Americans putting 10 million in the field given the time ( they had the resources). Not to mention the industrial might . The American's seemingly grandiose dream of putting thousands of aircraft at the front could of and probably would have been reached had the war been prolonged another year or more. Add improved technologies and tactics and the critical and increasingly worsening condition of Germanys population and the options that nation faced consisted of either internal collapse, defeat or total defeat. Or, one last go for broke effort.
The 1918 offensive from the point of view of Imperial Germany was not a choice but a necessity. Their hand was forced for if enthusiasm to support the war was waning in the population and forces of the UK it was almost certainly at least equally true of Germany. If the war was not ended soon it would have ended itself and the chances of a victory, or even a partial victory over the allies via attritional warfare ended with American involvement.
I know I am drifting off the course of this thread which dealt with the causes of the British 5th Army's performance in the spring of 1918. I suppose the point I am trying to make is that after four years of the sort of warfare being waged in France I would be much more surprised by the lack of mental exhaustion then by its presence. The real tribute is that in the end , like an exhausted fighter in the final round surviving the last great effort by his opponent, they were able to hold on just enough.