Aircraft transfer to the East - failure or not?

[rammjaeger]

Different German sources underline it was a failure to transfer some squadrons and a Kampfgeschwader to the East short before the Somme offensive started. It is said this transfer helped a lot to allow the Allieds to establish air superiority or even supremacy if the battle started.

On the other hand the Russian general Brussilow underlined in his memoires the importance of the German air superiority if he was trying to take away the town Kowel and to achieve a major break through on this sector of the front. He reported: "The enemy used often sections of 20 and more machines. He disturbed our air reconaissance and the work of the artillery observer who were directing the artillery fire. We could even not think about the arise of balloons for air reconaissance. ... Therefore the precise location of the enemy artillery positions was not known, and it was impossible to correct the fire of the heavy artillery in the flat, but wooded area. Therefore our well-shooting artillery could not achieve impact, could not prepare the infantry attack in a proper way and was not able to hold down the enemy artillery which was superior in numbers."

I am not aware of the correct number of aircraft send to the East but I am tending to believe it was not a failure to send the aircraft to the East. I would like to hear the opinions of other Forumites about that.

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Hannes Täger:
I don't consider the German air effort a failure, just the opposite a success! The demands of the deployment of Fl. Abt and Fl.Abt.(A) weere adequate to meet the demand of the German armies. There were 2 at the most Jasta on the eastern front, and these filled the needs to meet any Russian threat. The Germ army air organization was adequate t meet the demands of the german armies, Corps and Division. The transfer of a KAGOHL from the west to the eastern front may have been unnecessary, but they did support the operations of the German armies. The air organization was thin compared to the Western Front.
Blauer himmel
Dan-San Abbott

These are just the type of problems you get,when you
get in two front wars.Now the US was in a two front
war in WW2.But they had two ponds as a buffer
.Germanys cross to bear has been two front land wars.

[leo]

Much of the Ostfront was manned by kuk troops. The Brusilov offensive fell quite heavily on them. In most cases they were routed. It was very important for the Central powers to stop this offensive. It was halted after heavy losses by German and kuk troops.

leo

Hannes: The battle opened with a huge barage. The allies fired thousands and thousands of rounds in the belief that they could and would obliterate the German positions at the front and rush infantry and cavalry through in a decisive move. When the shelling stopped, the Germans crawled out of their bunkers, manned their machine guns and unspeakable carnage followed. If there was such air superiority, why weren't the recon guys picking up the German bunkers and calling into question the effectiveness of the shelling? Perhaps the problem was weather. I haven't been able to locate any information about it. Perhaps the answer is in a spirited German defense of the air space in that sector, but whatever the case, thousands of soldiers--believing the arty had done the job--walked, yes walked, to their deaths.
I have to wonder where the strategic failure really was.
DD

[rammjaeger]

Denny,

I leave the discussion of the failure of this offensive to the specialists in this field!

I can only say the German sources underline the Allied Air supremacy and overwhelming strength of artillery fire against German units which suffered from a lack of ammunition and were losing already 9 observation balloons on 25th June. The latter air attack and the continued Air offensive were preventing this kind of observation in the next time. An Allied deserter reported a future Allied main attack on 29th June. Surprisingly my source (Max Schwarte) states also that some German air units were just coming from the East (!) to the Somme. So it seems now it was more an exchange of air units than an one-sided transfer to the East! I think that supports Dan-Sans evaluation of the situation.

The contemporary Allied sources add the Allied failure often to bad weather, the German sources to the fighting spirit and the better training of the German infantrists. Especially the ability to make independend decisions by themselfes (if cut-off by the enemy) and the art of improvisation was underlined in German sources. Obviously the Allied artillery did not knock-out all German artillery positions and bunkers (some survived even 24 cm-hits).

VBR

Hannes