On The Effectiveness Of Ground Attack In The Great War part 2

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post #10 (merged) quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

Why would I "want to look at my own quotes again"...?

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

You want to look at them again, because they don't support the cause you are espousing, and thus you might wish to retract them....

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

Retract them! You are amusing if nothing else..

I will try one more time-

"...we found the country roads much blocked with troops and transport of all kinds. The staff work has failed here, and for miles transport congested all the approaches. ONE ENTERPRISING BOCHE AIR SQUADRON, flying low, could have played the duece here on these roads, but NOT ONE CAME"

Colonel Repington at St. Mihiel noting American failures in staff work.

Repington--'The First World War'

You seem unable to grasp that IF the idea of the big German offensives of 1918 was to win the war----to drive a wedge between French and British and, (defeating the British meant the end for France also), thus accomplish something that no other offensives on the Western front had managed then the absolute need for SOME arm of exploitation ---ANY arm that could harrass the retreating troops into full rout was ESSENTIAL.

In those day's---sorry if you struggle with this--that arm was cavalry---but the Germans had left ALL of that in the East....in the Baltic and Ukraine.
They had no armoured cars and (unlike the British) not even motorcycle mounted (sidecar) machine guns!

They had no interest in (not wholly misplaced) Tanks (not ever in that war anything remotely like a war winning weapon) and therfore--and this is my point the pursuit of the retreating British could be accomplished only as quickly as the Germans could walk!!---And that is the same speed that the British could walk also, therefore NO exploitation of a crushed and temporarily retreating enemy could be possible.

That scenario equates to failure for Germany---and that on the last throw of the dice. Not ideal I am tempted to say.

Now what other ARM OF EXPLOITATION did they have? Well, Aeroplanes.

Did THEY turn retreat into rout? Well, patently not.

Are you sure the cause for the British retreat was "CL and Sturmtruppen"

I posit an alternative reason-

The attack on 21st. March fell on the British 5th. army ELEVEN DIVISIONS STRONG (with two Cavalry Divisions--but in action a cavalry division dismounted is only the equivalent of an infantry brigade) 3rd. Army further north had 10 divisions (with four in reserve). 25 Divisions.

50 ---that is FIFTY German divisions were in action that day---look no further for a severe defeat. look no further at 'stormtroopers'---dismiss "CL" types as of no import---in the final analysis!--FIFTY divisions of farm labourers could have accomplished nearly as much...

Was the "Baron machine-gunning columns of allied troops just day's before his own demise"?


Did'nt cause a rout anywhere!

But I tire of attempting to do the impossible, and your high handed tone has limited my urge to enlighten you further.."I might want to retract" is rich coming from someone who needed to be told MvR was NOT shot in the head.....


After checking further I see that of those FIFTY German Divisions---no fewer than FORTY THREE of them were in action against Fifth Armies 11 or max. 12.---and aided of course by fog.

'The Evolution Of Victory'--- Andy Simpson

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post #11 quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

Let me repeat Eric---I never say the German ground attack aeroplanes did nothing----that would be both silly and ignorant of history and I am niether.

What I do say is simple----No British histories, no regimental histories make VERY MUCH of German ground attack---and "havoc" ----never on the British front!!

In that supreme moment of near victory for Germany WHY was'nt just about everything airworthy thrown, with machineguns and bombs, against the retreating British---close, very close to routed British (but not close enough)?

It was in fact the R.A.F that did that, exactly that, to the Germans!
'All arms attacks were the forte of the allies, NOT the Germans.
To enunciate the tactics to be used is one thing---but to PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE---well, that is something else entirely I think.

Please do not assume my capitals mean I am shouting Eric

Dave.

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

original post on the above link

"The German chance to achieve complete victory (indeed it was what they were planned and executed for) came and went in those last offensives in 1918 and those much lauded 'specialised' machines accomplished nothing on the main front." Your quote, my Italics. I really am not sure just what it is that you are trying to say, but it seems that you feel the German CL types did little or nothing, and I am afraid that is just not true! You base your position on 'British histories,' and I think that is the point I have been trying to make all along. 'The winners write the histories,' and it seems you have fallen squarely into that trap! I have given you several German accounts of just how effective these aircraft and their tactics were, and the German High Command was impressed enough to demand ever more of these kind of aircraft. I have never tried to denigrate the honor or combat abilities of the Allied forces at the time, and fully admit that the German Army in its great offensive, failed comprehensively. Further, I fully agree that the lack of cavalry, or effective mechanized forces are probably a big reason why the Germans were unable to exploit their advances during that offensive (lessons that were hard-won, and applied MOST diligently during WW2!).

But aircraft, no matter HOW advanced, cannot take or hold ground, never have, never will. This is why merely substituting CL-type aircraft for effective cavalry would never achieve anything like the same success, nor was it ever intended to be. Stukas didn't take Poland, or France, or anywhere else. They were a PART of a combined arms team, and very, very effective in their intended usage, and the CL's were very similar in that respect. The DIFFERENCE is that the Stukas had Panzer tanks and Panzer-Grenadiers in trucks and APC's to follow-up the confusion and disorganisation sewn by the Stukas, but the CL's did not. Doesn't mean the CL's didn't achieve their intended objectives, or demonstrate their abilities; it just means 'they didn't stick!'

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Post # 12 edited slightly, quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

original post on the above link

And since this topic is SUPPOSED

here is a report from Ernst Udet, who was personally recruited to Jasta 11 by the Baron on 15 March, 1918. leaving the Jasta for a different command on 8 April This flight occurred at the end of March, 1918:

“Richtofen, the steel point of our wedge formation, continues in a steep glide towards the Roman road. At a height of about ten metres he races along the ground, both machine guns firing without letup into the marching columns on the road. We stay behind him and pour out more fire.

‘A paralyzing terror seems to have seized the troops – only a few make the ditches. Most fall where they walk or stand. At the end of the road (von Richtofen) makes a tight turn and proceeds with another pass along the treetops. Now we can clearly observe the effect of our first strafing run – bolting horse teams, abandoned guns which, like breakwaters, stem the oncoming human flood.

‘This time, we receive some return fire from below. Infantrymen stand there, rifles pressed to the cheek, and from a ditch, a machine gun barks up at us. But Richtofen does not come up a single metre because of this, even though his wings are taking bullet holes.’ After this flight, Udet was made CO of Jasta 11, downing two Camels within days.

So here you have a report, from a reliable witness (unless you wish to call Herr Udet a liar), not only of an effective German ground attack during the ‘big push’ of the Germans in 1918, but also a scene that (minus the bombs!) is remarkably similar to that portrayed in the ‘Blue Max!’ And it wasn’t by CL’s, but by Fokker DR1’s, which should put paid to your notion about ‘why didn’t the Germans throw everything in to the attack?’ In just two words, they did!

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Post # 13

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

As Aristotle would say,
"one swallow does not make a summer"
I never once alluded (you really must stop saying what you THINK I said and read posts more carefully) to "taking and holding ground" Now did I?

I was talking about an instrument that IF USED might have turned retreat into rout (no "holding ground" in a rout) but because it was never tried the moment of supreme chance for Germany passed.

Indeed the moment also failed because the R.A.F. Fighters, Bombers, Corps machines even, were ALL DOING just that---to the Germans to stem the tide.

The tide was stemmed--The British effort helped. The tide was stemmed--The German effort never happened...

If I was to claim the V1's had no effect on the war (2nd.)---someone could counter with statistics of homes destroyed, people killed or mutilated and claim that was some effect..

Well, in a limited sense of course they would be right, but in the overall scheme of things they would be wrong---the V1's THOUGH THEY DID SOMETHING (of course) achieved nothing of strategic or even tactical worth.

I NEVER said that German aeroplanes NEVER attacked targets on the ground.

British pilots threw themselves into that with great----I would maintain vital tactical and strategic-- results. German pilots made NO such impact--and I'm sorry that you denigrate British Historians----I wonder what history would have looked like had Germany won and, by your logic, "wrote history"

Your assumption of what I base my understanding on is presumptious and contentious,

Let me add one word to your supposed Parthian shot-

They did NOTHING

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post #14

Originally Posted by Terrencejones

original post on the above link

A few quotes from "German Aircraft of the First World War" Peter Gray & Owen Thetford.
"They were used to such good effect during the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917 that they were especially mentioned in a Court of Enquiry convened by the British to examine the cause of the success of the German counter-attack...
the Schlachtstas.. played a far more offensive role than any other branch of the German Air Force....Special plans for the most effective use of the Schlachstas were drawn up by the German Chief of Staff in readiness for the March 1918 offensive, by which time no less than thirty of these units were to be in existence" it goes on to say there is scant information published on the "Battle Flights" (the special plans are included in full as appears in Vol 4 "The War in The Air" by H.A Jones)

If these "Battle Flights" were indeed so effective and some 30 units of them were in existence what happened to them at a time when they could have made a real difference? They may have been far more offensive than other branch of the German Air Force but what did they actually achieve? The scant information appears to be the fact they were not there when they should have been!

Terry

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post # 15

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

original post ...

And this is WHY I have been giving you back your own quotes, because they don't make any sense in view of your position. I DON'T denigrate British histories, but merely make the point that they are only ONE side of the coin, and to truly understand what happened, you need to look at BOTH. Can you understand this?

The fact that the Germans were able to push forward forty miles in their great offensive, the furthest push on the Western Front by either side up until then, indicates quite profoundly that the Germans use of coordinated airpower, and their effectiveness (for a time!) WAS significant to the advance of the ground forces. The Germans had made uncounted attacks before, and so had the Allies all up and down the line, and despite the best marshalling and concentration of troops and artillery, even explosion of huge mines, no significant advances had been made until Spring, 1918 by ANYONE. So what was the significant difference in Spring, 1918? Yes, the Germans had a lot more troops available, but they had had very large numbers of troops concentrated before (Verdun, for instance). Yes, the Allies managed to stop the advance as the Germans were unable to exploit their opportunities and wore themselves out. So what? What does that have to do with German use of CL types, or effective ground attack by aircraft generally? Suppose, just suppose, that when the Allies made THEIR massive counterattack, they HADN'T used aircraft. How successful would that have been? And as the German push had occured before theirs, don't you suppose that they just might have LEARNED something from the Germans, and used it themselves to good effect?

I have not 'presumed' anything, as you see, just have been calling upon you to justify positions that have no firm basis in history, British, or otherwise. You have repeatedly stated that the 'proof' that the CL's were ineffective is that they did not perform the functions of cavalry. As I have stated before, aircraft CANNOT perform the function of cavalry, or armor, or infantry either, for that matter. Aircraft cannot TAKE ground, they cannot HOLD ground either, only disrupt, destroy or interfere with lines of communications and supply, and take out 'nodes' of command and control, thus allowing other forces (infantry, cavalry, etc) to advance and take advantage of the defenders lack of command and control. In other owrds, aircraft come in, do what they do, and then leave! Cavalry (and their modern version, armor) once through the front line can move throughout the rear area of the enemy. They can position themselves to interdict supply routes, lines of communications, destroy command posts, supply dumps, etc, and more importantly, they can also STAY there and defend these interdictions, or move elsewhere to do the same thing, thus requiring forces to be redeployed to deal with them, or flee in disarray. Aircraft CANNOT do these things, and ground redeployment is not required to counter them, so let's not hear any more about 'why didn't the Germans just substitute aircraft for cavalry?'

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post #16 edited

If these "Battle Flights" were indeed so effective and some 30 units of them were in existence what happened to them at a time when they could have made a real difference? They may have been far more offensive than other branch of the German Air Force but what did they actually achieve? The scant information appears to be the fact they were not there when they should have been!

Terry

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

op

I think a forty mile advance by the German forces in Spring, 1918 pretty much indicates 'where' those Schlastas werer located, and what they were doing as well!

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post #17 edited

Originally Posted by RussGannon

op

Dave

Suspect this 6 Sep 17 schlacta story actually relates to 6 Sep 18. Will investigate and get back.

Going off the cuffe on 10 Jul 17 - the two poor battalions east of canal were subjected to an intense day long bombardment and had already suffered 75 % cas before ground assault went in. But true it was backed up by low flying German aircraft.

Cheers Russ

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post # 18

Originally Posted by totalspoon

op

Interesting discussion,

To rebut some of Eric’s point,

1. Just because the Spring Offensive was successful, doesn’t mean that the CL’s were. That would be like saying that just because Cambrai failed that tanks were a waist of time.
2. Low flying pilots aren’t the best source for effective damage assessments. Pilots though out the ages (on all sides) have always thought they have done far more damage that they actually did. That is why unit histories are a far better indicator of they actual effect of air attacks.

On a slightly different note, what always puzzles me is why there’s a presumption that the German CL’s were a much more effective than Commonwealth Fighters at ground attack.

In the Offense, Commonwealth fighters carried a larger bomb load and two forward firing machine guns while CL’s generally only had one. True the CL’s had a rear flexible gun but their fire had some serious problems as your ‘Own Speed’ means your bullets have to be aimed way behind a perpendicular target, the angle of deflection being a function of speed and range. Compared with a forward firing gun where you don’t have to add deflection at a stationary target, hitting with a flexible gun at a perpendicular stationary target is much harder and less effective. Have you ever heard of an IL2 circling to give the gunner a shot?

On the Defence, the only protection for the pilot, engine and fuel tank was speed and manoeuvrability and once again, the smaller, faster, more agile Commonwealth fighter had to have an edge over the larger, slower, less agile CL.

I just can’t see ANY superiority in the CL’s

Spoon

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post # 19

Originally Posted by bristol scout

op

And the most (in my poor philosophy) telling reason--the most blindingly obvious reason (unless I'm stupid) why the Germans could roll up a thinly defended,(manpower shortages because of political posturing at home---the age old problem with democracy at war) recently taken over from the French part of the line has absolutely more to do with 43 German divisions (17,000 men to a Division!!!--Massive artillery --and fog) and considerably less to do with "CL and Sturmtruppen", though why you can't just call them stormtroops I don't know.

This 'great offensive' achieved nothing either---Martin Middlebrook (oh! gosh, another history written by the victors--what am I thinking here?) AFTER A GREAT DEAL of careful work put's the casualties on 21st. March at 38,512 British/dominion and 39,929 German-----Pyrrhus would have understood!

The fact is that the Germans achieved there full hopes on only a quarter of the front they attacked--at the cost of casualties that could not be replaced..

Middlebrook also concludes ---sorry, I know you will have none of it but never mind --

"In my opinion if there had been no fog the German casualties would have greatly exceeded the 40,000 .....and that the German advance would have been halted in most places..."

In other words just another failed attempt on the western front---indeed Ludendorffs attack plan is almost identical to Haigs 1916 Somme plan --but in reverse...

The great Theban victory over the hitherto incomparable Spartans at Leuktra in 371 B.C. was NOT the result of Theban superiority in skill or morale---it was simply numbers at the point of impact ---a Phalanx FIFTY columns deep instead of eight or so...Napoleon was partially right The big battalions DO sometimes win....

I find your grasp of history shaky, More trust in books and less in trawling the internet perhaps...you're mistrust in 'perfidious British type history' both familiar here--and beneath contempt, and suspicious.....and your "lets not hear anymore" in relation to an argument I never promulgated in the first place insulting in the extreme.

Take the good advice of some here and check out the long running threads on this very subject ---and not THAT long ago...

You talked about "Stukas and armour" in an earlier post ----a more accurate simile would be the desert air force in 1941-

"The achievement of the Western Desert Air Force was to retain the initiative throughout, and to provide a strong defensive weapon with which to attack the Panzerarmee and delay it's advance. Thus Eighth Army was able to take it's positions at the Alamein Line in time to face the enemy successfully in a final stand. The Air force, still unflagging, participated fully in the fierce battles of early July, in which Rommel's army was at last decisively checked and forced to go over to the defensive.

'The Right Of The Line'--John Terraine.

No closer parallel could be found to March 1918 than this.

I shall not waste time re-fighting old battles---check the search feature and open your mind to real history as it seems to me you are saying I place too much faith in 'British type histories' (whatever they may be) whilst it is quite permissable for you to place (more than deserved) faith in German histories----Double standards will not go far here amongst people who have studied History for more than half a century...Nor will blatant 'own twists' to anothers argument passed on AS THAT argument prove your point.