On The Effectiveness Of Ground Attack In The Great War part 2

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Continuation of this thread

http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/ot...great-war.html

Some posts from another thread are quoted and reposted here as they belong here.

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post #1 edited slightly for clarity, quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

But essentially you are on firmer ground with your earlier post- 16---groundfire was a major killer of pilots----well, of British pilots, because British pilots involved themselves (voluntarily often) in what was going on down low because they NEVER forgot their role as an adjunct to the army (how could they--until 1st. April 1918 they WERE army....)

I know of no cases were German 'fighters' were fitted with detachable light bomb racks and ordered to do things like 'bomb and shoot up everything' or 'very low fling essential'

How many of their experienced pilots would have fallen to 'invisible' killers on the ground, which was the lot of so many British pilots----but those same tactics paved the way for--or at least greased the wheels--or at the very least could'nt have hindered-- eventual victory...


Dave.

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post #2 edited slightly for clarity, quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

original post on the above link

The Allies did a fair bit of ground attack missions with a variety of fighter aircraft in the last six months (I think it was mostly whatever and whomever was available at any given time), in a crude imitation of the German technique used with the specialized CL and J-type aircraft, but they didn't give a lot of thought to specialized aircraft for ground attack until very late in the war (Sopwith Salamander, etc). As a result, I am quite sure you are right, the Allies likely lost a fair number of aircraft and pilots to groundfire as well...

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post #3 edited slightly for clarity, quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

T
Hi Eric,

Well now you have moved into the realm of fantasy---I would claim somewhat more than the "last six months".

I would claim that EVEN Corps. machines were machine-gunning enemy troops as early as Messines-in July 1917-that perfect example of the 'all arms' attack. And by the end of July, start of August that this was official doctrne.

I further claim involvement in ground attack was the main killer of British aircrew--and the German "specialised" types failed singularly to achieve anything like the same (or more----as these were specialised) results right up to the end of the war...I know of no regimental histories that mention any near routs when falling back in 1918---nor of any hold-up's when advancing to victory later that year---remotely caused by--or involving, German 'specialised' aeroplanes!

I claim low flying British aircrew saved the allies twice from almost certain destruction. Once (in the low flying recce. role) during the retreat from Mons in 1914 when they spotted von Kluck's army wheeling South-east---resulting in the battle of the Marne, and once again (during the retreat of March 1918)
in the ground attack role (as Artillery co-ordination by Corps machines had naturally temporarily broken down) which had a huge effect on the speed of the German 'pursuit' ---although without cavalry I am at a loss to imagine what the Germans imagined 'pursuit' to be...

The German chance to achieve complete victory (indeed it was what they were planned and executed for) came and went in those last offensives in 1918 and those much lauded 'specialised' machines accomplished nothing on the main front.

Dave.

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post #4 edited slightly for clarity, quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

original post on the above link

Well, you have made a lot of statements here, some of which may be true, and some not. Yes, the Allies did do ground attack sporadically THROUGHOUT the war, but as a specifically designed and significant part of pushing forward a ground offensive with ground attack 'en masse,' I don't think you can realistically claim this for the Allies until the last six months, and was mostly an 'ad hoc' affair at best.

The CL-types that the Germans came up with were designed specifically to work in close association with 'storm troops,' which were a new tactic for the German army, and in many ways presaged the much later 'blitzkrieg' technique used in WW2. German CL-types were quite well-known and infamouss for their abilities to break up Allied attacks, confuse defenses, and support and coordinate with Sturmtruppen moving forward, and they did this in fairly large numbers (I know of at least one instance when 24 Halberstadt CL's concentrated on one portion of the Somme line on 6 September, 1917. They 'wrought havoc' among Allied troops trying to cross the Somme bridges, essentially stopped the Allied effort, and thenceforth were an integral part of every German push, and in fact, were a major contributing factor to the successful German counter-offensive at Cambrai on 30 November, 1917 as well. The CL's were SO effective, and SO indicative of upcoming German ground activity, that the presence of Halberstadt CL's at any point on the line was considered a prime indicator for a German 'push,' and that Allied pilots were specifically instructed to look for them, and not confuse them with the superficially similar Halberstadt CV, which was only used for observation/reconnaissance.

The fact that the CL's were so successful in their efforts was a prime factor in the creation of the subsequent armored J-types as well, and these planes simply would not have 'got off the ground' if the German High Command did not think them most useful for their purposes. Finally, the fact that the Allies began serious consideration of specialized armored ground-attack aircraft in the final months of the war should probably be considered the highest form of flattery for the concept and use of the highly verstaile German CL's, don't you think?.....

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post #5 quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

The 'stormtroops' "which were a new tactic" were in fact a serious admission of failure in themselves..

'Divisions intended for offensive purposes were taken out of the line in Jan. and Feb. in order to devote themselves entirely to training and equipment'
(Ludendorff speaking)

These formations enjoyed priority in the distribution of materiel and horses (in desperate short supply) The REMAINDER had to accept lower supplies of everything---artillery, mortars, transport--even forage. Ludendorff-

'regretted that the distinction between attack and trench divisions became established in the army. We tried to eradicate it, without being able to alter the situation which gave rise to it'

I agree Eric that the stormtroops had dramatic initial success---but this has led to a mythology that they were, in fact, a brilliant German innovation in 1918.

It was in fact a French officer Andre Laffargue who first advocated a system of 'infiltration' by trained, troops with automatic weapons, hand grenades and gas bombs----in 1915 (published in 1916)

Sir Edward Spears described a French attack on the Somme on 1st. July 1916 thus--
"The French had already adopted the self contained platoon as a unit. Tiny groups, taking every advantage of cover, swarmed forward, intangible as will o' the wisps, illusive as quicksilver. The German artillery was baffled and their defences overrun by these handfuls of men who were everywhere at once, In a few minutes they had disappeared over the skyline. The attack had been successful"

Laffargues pamphlet was translated into German and issued as a manual....

BUT---armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of super soldiers--as General Slim once, correctly, observed.

The method had striking success (21st. March) but--

"An army of the same experience as that of the 'contemptibles' (1914) would have had no problem in coping with stormtroopers, but the NEW ARMIES of Britain, through sheer lack of opportunity for training were much below that standard"

John Ewing--The History Of The 9th. (Scottish) Division.

The stormtroops were expended against men who never collapsed in the way the Russians had at Gorlice-Tarnow--or the Italians at Caporetto. As there best men became casualties, German tactics became clumsier, until they resembled the shoulder to shoulder onslaughts of 1914.

A British Official Historian remarks of (first army) an undoubted German defeat at Arras on 28th. March 1918-
"There is little to record except the severe casualties inflicted on the enemy"

On the 26th. of the same month General Byng informed Haig-
"In the South, near the Somme, the enemy is very tired and there is no real fighting taking place there. Friend and foe are, it seems, dead beat and seem to stagger up against each other"
Haig's Diary.

So much for "Blitzkrieg"

I know of no 6th. Sept. 1917 "havoc "--Indeed I know of no 'havoc' at any time on the British front caused by ground attacking German machines---No histories in my collection mention it---no Regimental histories make very much of it at all---few 'letters home' make any reference to it, but I will be glad to have a few quotes here Eric---this is how we learn.

Dave.

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post #6 quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

original post on the above link

This initial CL incident is remarked upon in a wide number of references, including Munson, but you can also see it in a variety of places online, including here:

Polish Aviation Museum Cracow

Here is another good quote about ground attack generally by the Germans:
"Trampled underfoot: The story of attack aviation in the German spring offensives of 1918," Chad G Clark, Air Power History,Summer 199, Volume 45, Issue 2, pp.16-25 (ISSN: 1044016X), also at http://www.ku.edu/carrie/archives/ww.../msg00245.html

Clark wrote:
"According to Ernest von Hoeppner, general of the Luftstreitkrafte, "The battle in Flanders had increased the possibilities for the use of aviation in a direction that was fully of significance for the further development of the arm."19 Noting the "great moral effect" of strafing attacks by low-flying aircraft, Hoeppner relates that on July 10, 1917, attack sorties were first arranged to systematically accompany advancing infantry, which advanced in coordination with a successful counterattack along the coast at Lombartzyde.20 Capt. Helmut Wilberg provided the intellectual foundation for German attack aviation. As Air Commander for the Fourth Army, Wilberg was the first to organize attack aircraft into formations, greatly enhancing the effectiveness of the mission.21 From these efforts, the Luftstreitkrafte found that aircraft used in units formed specifically for ground attack and "working in closest cooperation with their comrades on the ground," against enemy troops massing behind the lines prior to an offensive represented the best use of attack aviation. After Flanders, attack aviation represented an "opportunity that was not neglected."

As for Sturmtruppen tactics being used by the French, or anyone else prior to the Germans, it is important to remember and understand what made the Sturmtruppen different from the various Allied efforts prior. The Sturmtruppen worked WITH aircraft, and their attacks were COORDINATED with specialized ground attack aircraft, and this was never done by the Allied infiltrators. As such, the German effort was the first proper use of 'combined arms' that included aircraft, and certainly in its intial efforts was quite successful! The fact that the great German offensive eventually ground to a halt and then was pushed back had more to do with large numbers of fresh American troops pouring in alongside the already battle-hardened british and French than any failure in German tactics. They simply had waited too long to put the offensive in motion, or rather, were unable to get the offensive started quickly enough, and 'ran out of steam.'

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post #7 quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

Ah! the Americans were the reason the great offensives 'ground to a halt'---now I see

Sorry---but no, they were not.

The 'Kaiserschlacht' WAS a race against time-the last throw enabled by the defeat of a once powerful enemy against the only enemy still never to have been broken (or come perilously close). If that enemy (Britain and Dominion) did not oblige and crumple quickly, then perhaps more than one 'last throw' would be needed---but if the first (and most massive) had failed, what real hope for subsequent 'blows'?

It would simply become another phase in the wearing down process the pounding (as Wellington would have said) or the even more self explanatory "who hold's out the longest" as Haig said.---In one respect, the POTENTIAL of the American involvment was central to German planning of course. But the main weight of the attack fell on the British.

Indeed the front crumbled--on 21st. March the Germans had reached the British Gun line!! But now a cardinal weakness--

"The roads were fairly full, and this time while it would be wrong to say there was panic the retreat resembled more of a rout than had previously been the case, Everyone seemed anxious to get away as quickly as possible and regardless of anyone else...A few military policemen on horses tried to enforce some kind of order, but no one took much notice. HAD THE GERMANS BEEN ABLE TO BREAK THROUGH WITH CAVALRY OR ARMOURED CARS the war would have ended then"
Arthur Behrend--- 'As From Kemmel Hill'

Or--

"It was a crowning mercy that they had no cavalry. How many times during the retreat did we thank heaven for this! The sight of a few mounted men in the distance would at once send a ripple of anxiety and the word CAVALRY being whispered and passed down the line. Men looked apprehensively over their shoulders, fearful lest horsemen might be already behind them. Cavalry was the one factor which would have smashed morale in an twinkling"

Sydney Rogerson --'The Last Of The Ebb'

Cavalry---armoured car's----arms of exploitation---the historical role of cavalry was to run down broken troops---But all of Germany's Cavalry were in the East---ministering to Ludendorffs grandiose plans--What weapon of exploitation did the Germans have-----Attack aeroplanes!----Why are they

a) not mentioned.

b) not able to turn retreat into rout.

Because they were'nt doing much----note I don't say were'nt doing ANYTHING---but they made no impact--that's the point. and at that moment of supreme chance for Germany---why were not ordinary scouts strafing British columns constantly---all day?

No The Americans did'nt smash the great German offensives, though they helped.

Look no further than the Indomitable Canadians, the redoubtable Australians--but never forget the simple but hardened battle practitioners of the British regiments---nor the French of course, recovered from the mutinous moments and regaining there poise....

Dave.

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post #8 quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

Let me repeat Eric---I never say the German ground attack aeroplanes did nothing----that would be both silly and ignorant of history and I am niether.

What I do say is simple----No British histories, no regimental histories make VERY MUCH of German ground attack---and "havoc" ----never on the British front!!

In that supreme moment of near victory for Germany WHY was'nt just about everything airworthy thrown, with machineguns and bombs, against the retreating British---close, very close to routed British (but not close enough)?

It was in fact the R.A.F that did that, exactly that, to the Germans!
'All arms attacks were the forte of the allies, NOT the Germans.
To enunciate the tactics to be used is one thing---but to PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE---well, that is something else entirely I think.

Please do not assume my capitals mean I am shouting Eric

Dave.

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post #9 quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

original post on the above link

I think you might want to look at your own quotes again.... "Indeed the front crumbled--on 21st. March the Germans had reached the British Gun line!! But now a cardinal weakness--

"The roads were fairly full, and this time while it would be wrong to say there was panic the retreat resembled more of a rout than had previously been the case, Everyone seemed anxious to get away as quickly as possible and regardless of anyone else...A few military policemen on horses tried to enforce some kind of order, but no one took much notice. HAD THE GERMANS BEEN ABLE TO BREAK THROUGH WITH CAVALRY OR ARMOURED CARS the war would have ended then"
Arthur Behrend--- 'As From Kemmel Hill'

One of the main reasons the Brits were in this condition was largely due to the CL's and the Sturmtruppen. German aircraft WERE all over the place (the Baron being one of them, machine-gunning columns of Allied troops just days before his own demise), and they DID cause a LOT of problems for the Allies. You might want to have a look at some of the German references as well as the British on this topic, as it is well-known that nobody likes to report about problems encountered. As well, to equate aircraft with either cavalry or mechanized forces is now, and always has been a fallacy.

Here is an excellent source from the German side, written shortly after the war was over: The German Air Force In The Great War by Georg Paul Neumann

It makes for some interesting reading! Here's one good one in reference to the 'shootup' on the Somme:

ATTACKING THE SOMME BRIDGES AT BRAY AND ST. CHRIST
On the 6th of September 1917 we were compelled, to evacuate Peronne owing to the vigorous English attacks which were hurled against our lines, supported by a large number of tanks and heavy artillery fire. From the grey light of dawn until late in the evening our trench-strafing machines were in the air striving to relieve our hard-pressed infantry, and they wore on the ground barely long enough for the machines to be prepared for the next flight. Then one morning a pilot from an infantry contact patrol arrived with startling news of a hostile force composed of every branch of the service which was approaching Peronne from the south in a long column along the west bank of the Somme, at the point where the bridges at Bray and St. Christ crossed the river.
It seems a heaven-sent opportunity to the trench-strafing pilots, and a few minutes later twenty-four machines from our squadron start off on that fine September day. The prearranged height for assembly is soon reached: then the Halberstadts make straight for the lines, and soon Cambrai is beneath us. We have no difficulty in recognising the front lines, which are enveloped in a pall of smoke and dust. Without hesitation every machine plunges into that inferno, and it seems as though these gigantic birds rival each other in daring. The explosions of shell and. shrapnel are clearly visible against their dull background; thick black clouds of smoke roll across the earth. The iron song of the engine drowns all anxiety and soothes the nerves.
Only 1200 feet up; a rocket is fired as a signal, and the squadron splits into two lines, one behind the other. Two or three minutes later we are above the enemy. Nerves are strained to the uttermost, and with eager eyes we seek to pierce the thick clouds of smoke. We cast glances at the sky above, where great clouds, which seem to indicate the advent of bad weather, are appearing. Peronne, that devastated village, is blazing away on our left front; soon the shimmering ribbon of the Somme emerges through the haze, and a few seconds later we are over the objective. A quick glance at the map tells us that we have hit the right spot; there on the right lies Bray, and on the left is St. Christ. We see objects like thin cords stretched across the bridges. Not far ahead there appears a white puff of smoke, the first shrapnel shell welcoming our arrival; no damage is done. At a signal from the leader's machine we all descend in a steep glide upon the bridges!
One thousand feet, 800 feet, 500 feet—then—the heart beats until it seems that it must burst and every pulse in the body throbs. Down below on the bridge itself and the shore on either side are thick columns of men, horses, and wagons. A storm of machine bullets pours down upon them- At first no result is perceptible; it is almost as though we were shooting on some inanimate target; and then— men, horses, and lorries scatter pell-mell. Their only thought now is to save themselves by getting off the road, and we see them fleeing wildly in every direction. It is on the bridges themselves, however, that the confusion is at its worst. Teams break loose and jump into the river, men, beasts, and all; it seems as if the multitude were possessed by evil genii.
Our bombs and hand grenades whistle pitilessly down into the chaos, and I see more than one strike the very middle of the bridge. We are hardly 200 feet up, and it is possible to see every detail Again we return to the attack, and involuntarily one casts a glance at the villages on the east bank of the river, where, standing huddled up against a garden wall, arc between twenty and thirty horsemen. That in all probability will be the General Staff. Already the machine guns are chattering; the result is wild confusion, collisions, and a complete rout.
Suddenly two Sopwith scouts attack our machines from the left flank; after a short conflict I see one of them plunge down to destruction and the other hastily makes off. Twice again the machine guns rake the columns below, until almost every cartridge has been expended. After returning to our aerodrome to replenish our ammunition, we set off to the attack once more; again we met with the same success.
We had paralysed an entire English division ; our infantry gained time to consolidate their new positions in peace. Our achievement was commended by an Army communique in words that will never be forgotten, (Hermann.)

During the 1918 Offensive

We have already discussed the work of the reconnaissance machines. When the advance came to a standstill they were again required to take over the work usually associated with trench warfare. The trench-strafing machines worked indefatigably from all heights, and on every section of the battle front, directing most of their attention against the enemy's reinforcements. They specialised in attacking the narrow roads and bridges of the Somme, and the results of their work were seen in the evacuated region after the enemy had retreated. In co-operation with the artillery they frequently caused great confusion at such points. Throughout the whole of the offensive the infantry contact machines were working incessantly over the lines.