On The Effectiveness Of Ground Attack In The Great War part 2

[Romani]

Continuation of this thread

http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/ot...great-war.html

Some posts from another thread are quoted and reposted here as they belong here.

[Romani]

post #1 edited slightly for clarity, quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

But essentially you are on firmer ground with your earlier post- 16---groundfire was a major killer of pilots----well, of British pilots, because British pilots involved themselves (voluntarily often) in what was going on down low because they NEVER forgot their role as an adjunct to the army (how could they--until 1st. April 1918 they WERE army....)

I know of no cases were German 'fighters' were fitted with detachable light bomb racks and ordered to do things like 'bomb and shoot up everything' or 'very low fling essential'

How many of their experienced pilots would have fallen to 'invisible' killers on the ground, which was the lot of so many British pilots----but those same tactics paved the way for--or at least greased the wheels--or at the very least could'nt have hindered-- eventual victory...


Dave.

[Romani]

post #2 edited slightly for clarity, quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

original post on the above link

The Allies did a fair bit of ground attack missions with a variety of fighter aircraft in the last six months (I think it was mostly whatever and whomever was available at any given time), in a crude imitation of the German technique used with the specialized CL and J-type aircraft, but they didn't give a lot of thought to specialized aircraft for ground attack until very late in the war (Sopwith Salamander, etc). As a result, I am quite sure you are right, the Allies likely lost a fair number of aircraft and pilots to groundfire as well...

[Romani]

post #3 edited slightly for clarity, quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

T
Hi Eric,

Well now you have moved into the realm of fantasy---I would claim somewhat more than the "last six months".

I would claim that EVEN Corps. machines were machine-gunning enemy troops as early as Messines-in July 1917-that perfect example of the 'all arms' attack. And by the end of July, start of August that this was official doctrne.

I further claim involvement in ground attack was the main killer of British aircrew--and the German "specialised" types failed singularly to achieve anything like the same (or more----as these were specialised) results right up to the end of the war...I know of no regimental histories that mention any near routs when falling back in 1918---nor of any hold-up's when advancing to victory later that year---remotely caused by--or involving, German 'specialised' aeroplanes!

I claim low flying British aircrew saved the allies twice from almost certain destruction. Once (in the low flying recce. role) during the retreat from Mons in 1914 when they spotted von Kluck's army wheeling South-east---resulting in the battle of the Marne, and once again (during the retreat of March 1918)
in the ground attack role (as Artillery co-ordination by Corps machines had naturally temporarily broken down) which had a huge effect on the speed of the German 'pursuit' ---although without cavalry I am at a loss to imagine what the Germans imagined 'pursuit' to be...

The German chance to achieve complete victory (indeed it was what they were planned and executed for) came and went in those last offensives in 1918 and those much lauded 'specialised' machines accomplished nothing on the main front.

Dave.

[Romani]

post #4 edited slightly for clarity, quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by Eric Husher

original post on the above link

Well, you have made a lot of statements here, some of which may be true, and some not. Yes, the Allies did do ground attack sporadically THROUGHOUT the war, but as a specifically designed and significant part of pushing forward a ground offensive with ground attack 'en masse,' I don't think you can realistically claim this for the Allies until the last six months, and was mostly an 'ad hoc' affair at best.

The CL-types that the Germans came up with were designed specifically to work in close association with 'storm troops,' which were a new tactic for the German army, and in many ways presaged the much later 'blitzkrieg' technique used in WW2. German CL-types were quite well-known and infamouss for their abilities to break up Allied attacks, confuse defenses, and support and coordinate with Sturmtruppen moving forward, and they did this in fairly large numbers (I know of at least one instance when 24 Halberstadt CL's concentrated on one portion of the Somme line on 6 September, 1917. They 'wrought havoc' among Allied troops trying to cross the Somme bridges, essentially stopped the Allied effort, and thenceforth were an integral part of every German push, and in fact, were a major contributing factor to the successful German counter-offensive at Cambrai on 30 November, 1917 as well. The CL's were SO effective, and SO indicative of upcoming German ground activity, that the presence of Halberstadt CL's at any point on the line was considered a prime indicator for a German 'push,' and that Allied pilots were specifically instructed to look for them, and not confuse them with the superficially similar Halberstadt CV, which was only used for observation/reconnaissance.

The fact that the CL's were so successful in their efforts was a prime factor in the creation of the subsequent armored J-types as well, and these planes simply would not have 'got off the ground' if the German High Command did not think them most useful for their purposes. Finally, the fact that the Allies began serious consideration of specialized armored ground-attack aircraft in the final months of the war should probably be considered the highest form of flattery for the concept and use of the highly verstaile German CL's, don't you think?.....

[Romani]

post #5 quotation blocks removed to allow quoting again

Originally Posted by bristol scout

original post on the above link

The 'stormtroops' "which were a new tactic" were in fact a serious admission of failure in themselves..

'Divisions intended for offensive purposes were taken out of the line in Jan. and Feb. in order to devote themselves entirely to training and equipment'
(Ludendorff speaking)

These formations enjoyed priority in the distribution of materiel and horses (in desperate short supply) The REMAINDER had to accept lower supplies of everything---artillery, mortars, transport--even forage. Ludendorff-

'regretted that the distinction between attack and trench divisions became established in the army. We tried to eradicate it, without being able to alter the situation which gave rise to it'

I agree Eric that the stormtroops had dramatic initial success---but this has led to a mythology that they were, in fact, a brilliant German innovation in 1918.

It was in fact a French officer Andre Laffargue who first advocated a system of 'infiltration' by trained, troops with automatic weapons, hand grenades and gas bombs----in 1915 (published in 1916)

Sir Edward Spears described a French attack on the Somme on 1st. July 1916 thus--
"The French had already adopted the self contained platoon as a unit. Tiny groups, taking every advantage of cover, swarmed forward, intangible as will o' the wisps, illusive as quicksilver. The German artillery was baffled and their defences overrun by these handfuls of men who were everywhere at once, In a few minutes they had disappeared over the skyline. The attack had been successful"

Laffargues pamphlet was translated into German and issued as a manual....

BUT---armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of super soldiers--as General Slim once, correctly, observed.

The method had striking success (21st. March) but--

"An army of the same experience as that of the 'contemptibles' (1914) would have had no problem in coping with stormtroopers, but the NEW ARMIES of Britain, through sheer lack of opportunity for training were much below that standard"

John Ewing--The History Of The 9th. (Scottish) Division.

The stormtroops were expended against men who never collapsed in the way the Russians had at Gorlice-Tarnow--or the Italians at Caporetto. As there best men became casualties, German tactics became clumsier, until they resembled the shoulder to shoulder onslaughts of 1914.

A British Official Historian remarks of (first army) an undoubted German defeat at Arras on 28th. March 1918-
"There is little to record except the severe casualties inflicted on the enemy"

On the 26th. of the same month General Byng informed Haig-
"In the South, near the Somme, the enemy is very tired and there is no real fighting taking place there. Friend and foe are, it seems, dead beat and seem to stagger up against each other"
Haig's Diary.

So much for "Blitzkrieg"

I know of no 6th. Sept. 1917 "havoc "--Indeed I know of no 'havoc' at any time on the British front caused by ground attacking German machines---No histories in my collection mention it---no Regimental histories make very much of it at all---few 'letters home' make any reference to it, but I will be glad to have a few quotes here Eric---this is how we learn.

Dave.