Ralph O'Neill on General Mitchell and Jimmy Meissner

[Lufbery]

I've been buying all the back issues of Over the Front now that they're available on Kindle.

In Volume 2, Number 2 from Summer 1987, there is a wonderful interview with Ralph O'Neill of the 147th Aero Squadron.

He was quite a character and there is a lot in the interview that is very interesting. However, at the end, he has this to say:

In addition to not getting the command of the 147th Aero there was another thing that made me very bitter. Of course, I didn’t have any idea of making aviation my career, but then towards the end of the war, Mitchell, passed orders back, I don’t think they were on paper, that any pilot that had combats, victories that were not confirmed should now put in for that confirmation with him. This, as you know, was a sticky thing. We had been using the British method of observation—confirmation from the ground, until we got under Mitchell and then he began to use the French method of confirmation. A pilot could confirm another pilot’s victories and many victories were confirmed. In addition to that, in group formation of seven Americans of the Second Pursuit Group, shot down two Germans, each of the seven got confirmations for two Germans, making it appear that there had been 14 shot down. So, it was during that refiling for confirmations that I refused to be a part of it because it was a sham. I had victories that had not been confirmed because they were too far over the lines or had not been reported, I was certain that I had gotten 11 Germans and only six had been officially confirmed. But Meissner worked in something up to eight victories, and we got half a dozen new aces, due to these phony confirmations. Mitchell swelled his records in the last three weeks of the war to 300 victories that were nowhere to be seen on the ground. It was an impossibility. However, he was much smarter than Nixon. He had two fires in the last week of the war at his headquarters that destroyed his records.

So, are any of his statements about victory claims and inflated records corroborated in any other sources?

Thanks,

[Lufbery]

Hmm. I was hoping this thread would get some responses. Ralph O'Neill's statements are somewhat harsh!

[Gregvan]

Hi Lufbery,

Yes, they are harsh but not unwarranted.

When he says, "We had been using the British method of confirmation - observation from the ground.." This may be because the 147th had initially been commanded by Major Geoffrey Bonnell, who had served in the RFC and was highly respected by his men. Bonnell's rules about confirmation might have been influenced by his time in the RFC, although I have no knowledge of any specific guidelines he may have issued. As far as I know, British airmen could help to confirm each other's victories. As has been shown by numerous threads on this forum, the confirmations in many British units were pretty easily obtained, with little actual proof. It often depended upon the unit's commander and their incentive to get results.

When, after Meissner took command, "under Mitchell", they began using the French method (??) of confirmation, I believe he's probably referring to Meissner using the similar methods he'd been accustomed to in the 94th Aero Sqn. In my opinion, the actual French confirmation system was pretty strict - much more so than the British and especially the Americans. For instance, a very high percentage of Guynemer's confirmed victories can be corroborated by German records. Many French aces had a large number of claimed victories that failed to be confirmed under French rules, especially Fonck and Madon; these were recorded as "probables" but did not count as official victories and did not contribute to the pilot's total. The "probables" were, somewhat, similar to the British "out of control" or "driven down" categories (which were counted in a pilot's total, when that was computed). Frank W. "Bill" Bailey told me that if the French had used the same system as the British, then Fonck's "probables" would count and he would have 126 victories.

It seems to me that it's pretty obvious that American confirmations were issued very liberally, and this is generally acknowledged by most serious historians of the subject. O'Neill's comments about everyone in a group combat getting a joint confirmation for one victory is accurate, and this inflated the scores of many WWI Yank airmen. But that view can make one very unpopular in some quarters.

In the German air service, just FYI, there were no "joint" or shared confirmations, (one plane shot down = one victory for one pilot, no matter how many participated) and this often led to a throw of the dice between two claimants, and heated arguments among the pilots.

[spad]

The Americans do appear to adopt every possible method of awarding victories. I have written in the past about the 93rd AS pilot who fired his guns at a German aircraft and then lost sight of it. He didn't claim it himself but was awarded it later

However the more I read of this the more I see that much of the rationale for this was as much to do with senior officers of all nations using refelcted glory to boost their professional career, or in the case of Americans, their piolitical career.

The French use of the classification "probable" was very nebulous. I remember researching David Putnam and his unconfirmed/probable claims were ridiculous. I am not blaming him for this, I suspect this was a bit of manipulation for propaganda purposes by both French and American officers.

In truth even Fonck would have been struggling to boost his score more than it was at the end of the war. I believe there was quite a bit of official manipulation of his claims.

I am not going to defend the RFC/RAF from this as my posts for this last twenty-five years have shown

K

K

[regular122]

I suppose too it is all at how one looks at it when it comes to who deserves a claim. If a flight maneuvers in such a way to bring down their enemy, their combined actions are arguably responsible for that outcome. Some flight commanders had no issue awarding claims to their entire flight for an aircraft brought down on that basis. On examination, each man shares some of that credit. During WWII, the Americans and British recognized such credit was deserved but refined it into fractional victories.

In my studies of Americans flying for the British or American squadrons assigned to the British, by 1918, most 'driven downs' did not count toward a victory. An 'out of control' did. If there was speculation, even with witnesses, a driven down was the norm--with no victory. An 'out of control' usually resulted from corroborating witness reports but unclear ground observation or confirmation--with victory usually awarded. A ground report would almost always result in a firm confirmation. Witnesses who reported an enemy in flames would usually result in a confirmed victory as well for that pilot.

Some flight leaders, even with confirmed criteria, chose to share the spoils rather than parse a claim. Others, such as Mick Mannock, would just pass on the claim to someone else, particularly new or promising airmen to strengthen their initiative and confidence.

Steve

[Lufbery]

Thank you all for the thoughtful responses!

Greg, I'm glad you addressed the French vs. British confirmation methods. Like you, I thought that the French had the more strict criteria for victories.

I guess a follow-up question is whether or not the claim inflation that O'Neill attributes to Mitchell was in good faith — that is, pilots who sincerely believed they should have gotten credit — or more cynical manipulation as O'Neill seems to state.

[regular122]

Originally Posted by Lufbery

Thank you all for the thoughtful responses!

Greg, I'm glad you addressed the French vs. British confirmation methods. Like you, I thought that the French had the more strict criteria for victories.

I guess a follow-up question is whether or not the claim inflation that O'Neill attributes to Mitchell was in good faith — that is, pilots who sincerely believed they should have gotten credit — or more cynical manipulation as O'Neill seems to state.

In every war, there are those brave souls that never get credit for their valor. Some get recognized according to what they actually deserve because they had good administrative types that submitted their awards efficiently. Others, just as brave, did not have that benefit. Their valor got lost in poor unit administration, destroyed papers, tactical moves, or whatever. Even in peacetime, warriors are always tempted to feel that some of those most deserving should receive their due awards.

I used to wonder why soldiers would get awards 50 years after an event. I don't wonder it any more based on my own experiences. Injustices sometimes catch up with the times and are righted. Many times they never are. The problem I have found is rarely the level of valor one displays (although in some rare cases, undeserving souls maybe got credit--but it is rare).

What the problem usually contains is an element of the environment at the time: chains of command, the stage of the conflict (earlier is stingier), actual witnesses, or even political climate. The warriors have little say in it. They just did their duty. When they get old (or even younger) some can get bitter. Pride can set in. Every three star general was certain they should have been a four star. Every four victory pilot was certain they should have had five, etc. It is a bitter game to go down that path.

I read a touch of that in O'Neill's comments. He took a stand on his view of how credits should be parsed. His fellow pilots ended up with the satisfaction of knowing they had served their country, while others received their due in victories or decorations in the eyes of their commanders. His call. His bitterness thereafter. His soldiers' loss.

Steve

[spad]

I am afraid I am quite cynical about "aces", much as I am about "heros". What I am sure of is that James McCudden was the epitome of the professional "ace". He refines his aircraft and his attacks based on the knowledge he acquires. His score matters but he is at the top of his profession and takes chances based on what he knows. He aims to survive but he knows his success will win him fame. Unlike many others it seems by German records he was successful. The propaganda machine gave him fame but unlike many others the machine was reporting the truth.

His death seems to fit his feeling that he knew everything, and sadly it killed him.

My rule of thumb is that for every three claims reduce it by two. Although for many, especially the great "aces" the reduction is much more.

[Gregvan]

Well, for an example of the liberal policy towards confirmation in the USAS, just FYI, here is Rickenbacker’s combat report of 10 October 1918:

REGION: Montfaucon-Doulcon.

NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED: 150 & 100

Lieut. Rickenbacker reports: Followed formation over Doulcon when five (5) Fokkers came down on the formation from the southeast. I piqued on one in the region of Clery le Petit and fired about 150 rounds in close range when I was forced to leave on account of other Fokkers behind. Did not follow him down. This combat took place about 15 h 52 at which time Lieut. Chambers claims a Fokker fell in flames. I then noticed a Spad below being chased by a Fokker. I piqued on him and fired about 100 rounds into him. When last seen, he was in a steep bank.
CONFIRMATION REQUESTED – Two (2) FOKKERS.
Endquote.

“When last seen, he was in a steep bank.”??? That's it? Rickenbacker did indeed get confirmation for two Fokkers downed, both at 15 h 52, one at 800 meters and the next at 600 meters.

https://photobucket.com/share/1bc052...5-22e622a2b861

https://photobucket.com/share/b35c0f...5-2a64ca6ff5e5

https://photobucket.com/share/d286fd...7-b1c4c8a6d215

[Lufbery]

Originally Posted by Gregvan

“When last seen, he was in a steep bank.”??? That's it? Rickenbacker did indeed get confirmation for two Fokkers downed, both at 15 h 52, one at 800 meters and the next at 600 meters.

Thanks for the example, Greg! If I recall correctly, Barrett Tillman did an analysis and wrote an article about Rickenbacker's victory claims and concluded that 7 of the 26 probably corresponded to actual German losses. I can't find the article now, though, so I hope I'm not misremembering Barrett's point.

The impression I get from the O'Neill interview is that there was a political/propaganda motivation behind what seemed to be a sudden push for victory confirmations at the end of the war.